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Innovation or Illegitimacy: Remedial

Receivership in Tinsley v. Kemp Public
Housing Litigation
Carolyn Hoecker Luedtke*
The traditional model of the judge as detached adjudicator, sitting high atop
a distant bench, has been blurred in the years since Brown v. Board of
Education.' The legal legacy from the battlefield of school desegregation is a

complicated interrelationship between right and remedy. Rather than
announcing a right and disappearing into chambers, today's judges are
increasingly involved in the detailed development of remedial schemes which
overhaul public institutions such as schools, child welfare agencies, prisons,
mental health systems, and public housing authorities. This genre of
litigation-dubbed "institutional reform litigation, '2 "structural reform
litigation,"3 and "public law litigation"' 4 -has been the source of much academic
debate and analysis during the past three decades. As litigation has been
increasingly used as a medium of social and political change, judicial remedies
have become important tools for lawyers and policymakers to understand.
Receivership, one institutional reform remedy that displaces the government
defendant and supplants government actors with a court-appointed receiver,
appears on its face to be one of the most invasive remedial tools in a judge's
arsenal. Receivership is a relatively new5 and rarely discussed 6 remedial tool on

* B.A., Princeton University (1994); J.D., Harvard Law School (1999). The Author
is clerking for the Honorable William W. Schwarzer, Northern District of Califomia. She
would like to thank Professor Margo Schlanger and Judge William Schwarzer for their
helpful insights and suggestions on the initial drafts of this Article. She would also like
to thank Julie Levin, Jeffrey Lines, Eugene Jones, and Robert Rosenberg for speaking
with her about their experiences in public housing.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Colin S. Diver, The Judge as PoliticalPowerbroker: SuperintendingStructural
Change in PublicInstitutions,65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979) (arguing that broad "institutional
reform litigation" has transformed the judge into a political powerbroker which threatens
to undermine judicial legitimacy).
3. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979)
(finding benefits to "structural reform litigation" despite the problems inherent with it,
ultimately adopting a wait-and-see approach).
4. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in PublicLaw Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976) (generally supporting the development of "public law litigation" in
achieving organizational change). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,
Remedies, and PublicLaw Litigation: Notes on the JurisprudenceofLyons, 59 N.Y.U.

L.REV. 1 (1984).
5. Twelve of fifteen known receiverships in institutional reform litigation occurred
in the 1990s. Receiverships occur more frequently in public housing litigation than any
other area. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 178 F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 1999) (partial
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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the landscape of public reform litigation. Receivership is increasingly requested
by plaintiffs and threatened by judges overseeing ineffective consent decrees and
contemptuous defendants

receivership placing Chicago's scattered-site program under receivership); Velez v.
Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (Chester, Pennsylvania); Pearson v. Kelly,
No. 94-CA-14030 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994) (District of Columbia); Perez v.
Boston Hous. Auth., 400 N.E.2d 1231 (Mass. 1980) (Boston). Public housing may be
more conducive to receivership because it is viewed more as a business than a public
institution because of its extensive asset base and similarity to private real estate
enterprises. In addition, there is a statutory avenue for administrative receivership in the

housing context. See infranote 9. Receivership is also more common in the District of
Columbia. See Inmates of D.C. Jails v. Jackson, 158 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(medical and mental health services in jails); Dixon v. Barry, 967 F. Supp. 535 (D.D.C.
1997) (mental health); LaShawn v. Kelly, 887 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1995) (child welfare
department); District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 738 A.2d 1206 (D.C.), cert. denied, 120
S. Ct. 1981 (2000) (Oak Hill youth prison school); Pearson v. Kelly, No. 94-CA-14030
(D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994) (public housing authority). Geographically, receivership
in D.C. may be more tenable because it exists in an unusual state of administrative flux
between the federal and local governments. For other receivership remedies, see Morgan
v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976) (South Boston High School); Shaw v.
Allen, 771 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) (county jail); Newman v. State of Ala., 466
F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (state prison system); Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp.
724 (S.D. Ga. 1966) (county school district); Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v.
Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Retardation, 424 Mass. 430 (1997) (Massachusetts
mental health); Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Chief Executive Officer,
444 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (county jail).
6. Only three case studies have considered true receivership remedies in
institutional reform litigation cases. See MARK MOORE, CREATING PUBLIC VALUE 241
(1995) (considering the Boston Housing Authority receivership from a public policy
perspective); Lynn E. Cunningham, Washington, D.C.'s Successful Public Housing
Receivership, 9 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. COMMuNrrY DEv. L. 74 (1999) (heralding the
success of receivership in D.C.'s public housing agency); Barry Stuart Roberts, The
Extent ofFederalJudicialEquitablePower: Receivership ofSouth Boston High School,
12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55 (1976) (criticizing the receivership of South Boston High
School during the protracted desegregation struggles in Boston); see also Lynn
Cunningham & Dennis Foley, Receivership as a Remedyfor PoorAgency Performance,
29 NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1034 (1996) (presenting a brief case study of the
Pearsonv. Kelly housing litigation and analyzing the receivership remedy).
7. For example, Federal District Court Judge Dean Whipple recently threatened
receivership in the Kansas City school desegregation litigation. See Editorial, Public
Spanking,KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 2, 1998, at B4 (noting Judge Whipple's exasperation
at the School Board's lack of cooperation with the Desegregation Monitoring Committee
and reporting that Judge Whipple "raised the possibility of placing the district in
receivership"); see also Ellen Borgersen & Stephen Shapiro, G.L. v. Stangler: A Case
Study in Court-OrderedChild Welfare Reform, 1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 189, 198 (reporting
that plaintiffs "favored vigorous enforcement action . . . up to and including a

receivership").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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Through an analysis of Tinsley v. Kemp,' a decade-long institutional reform
case aimed at changing Kansas City, Missouri public housing, this Article
engages in a case study focused on the receivership remedy in practice. Part I
chronicles the decade of litigation and remedial results that turned around the
troubled Kansas City Housing Authority ("Housing Authority"). Part II
examines the efficacy and legitimacy of court displacement of government actors
in the context of institutional reform litigation and compares receivership to

other remedial alternatives. Part IMI concludes that while receivership has unique
attributes, it is not a wholly extraordinary remedial measure. It was, however,
a resourceful response to the organizational incompetence and dysfunction at the
Housing Authority.
Public housing generally is in a state of crisis, and institutional reform
litigation is often the chosen means to effectuate change.9 At least twenty-eight
housing authorities in the United States are, or have been, the subject of reform
litigation.'0 Courtroom battles over public housing center on desegregation and
how to modernize run-down facilities. Because the 1937 Fair Housing Act,
which created the public housing system, did not provide funds for the
modernization of public housing, the majority of the nation's ten thousand aging
units of public housing are dilapidated, and often uninhabitable. It is estimated
that two-thirds of these public housing units require more than ten thousand
dollars each in maintenance and modernization expenditures, amounting to a
crisis for most local housing authorities' federally dependent budgets." In 1989,
the majority of Kansas City public housing was mn-down and desperately in

8. The subject of this case study is Tinsley v. Kemp, No. 89-0023-CV-W-1 (W.D.
Mo. filed Feb. 9, 1989), motion to dismiss, 750 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
9. Administrative intervention is another, recently expanded and increasingly
utilized, reform tool for public housing. Pursuant to federal statute, the Secretary of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") can petition a federal court
for the appointment of an administrative receiver (either another public housing agency
or a private management corporation) if the public housing agency is classified as
"troubled" according to statutory guidelines. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(j)(3)(A)(ii) (1994).
This administrative remedy may make more judges comfortable with imposing
receiverships in public housing litigation.
10. See ERICA HASHIMOTO, POVERTY AND RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL,
COMPELLING RESPONSIBILITY: A SUMMARY OF LITIGATION ESTABLISHING THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT'S LIABILITY FOR RACIALLY SEGREGATED HOUSING PATTERNS (1997)
(cataloging cases filed against HUD); see also Florence Wagman Roisman, Long
Overdue: Desegregation Litigation and Next Steps to End Discrimination and
Segregation in the Public Housing and Section 8 Existing Housing Program, 4
CITYSCAPE 171, 194-96 (1999) (listing desegregation cases involving HUD).

11. See Michael H. Schill, DistressedPublicHousing: Where Do We Go From

Here, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 497, 502 (1993) (arguing that public housing authorities should
be allowed to knock down dilapidated projects and rebuild scattered-site developments
or encourage private Section 8 vouchers).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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need of repair; as a result, Doletha Tinsley, a young single mother living in
public housing, joined with five other African-American women and filed suit.
I. THE STORY OF TINSLEY v KEMP

A. ProblematicHistory ofthe Kansas City HousingAuthority
The story of the Housing Authority prior to the Tinsley litigation is one of
institutional incompetence, extreme dysfunction, and organizational chaos. The
12
Housing Authority was a hybrid government agency, created by state statute,
yet almost exclusively financed by federal subsidies. The Housing Authority
was governed by a seven member board appointed by the Mayor of Kansas City,
Missouri. 3 The Board of Commissioners was responsible for all personnel
decisions, including hiring the Executive Director who managed the day-to-day
operations of the Housing Authority. In Kansas City, the Commissioners rarely
had experience with public housing administration or policy, and the Executive
Director was often ajob dispensed as a political favor. As appointed officials,
the Commissioners and the Executive Director had little accountability for their
performance. A Kansas City Star editorial described the Housing Authority's
problem prior to litigation as "not just years of politics, but incompetence,
chicanery and crime which have tainted this authority and hurt tenants."14
The Housing Authority was no stranger to class action litigation when the
Tinsley plaintiffs filed suit in 1989. In 1976, public housing residents residing
in Kansas City's Riverview development filed Vann v. Housing Authority of
Kansas City,'5 which accused the Housing Authority of explicit racial steering
in resident placement.' 6 The Vann plaintiffs asserted that prior to 1973, the
Housing Authority reserved two developments-Riverview and Guinotte
Manor-exclusively for white residents and relegated all non-white residents to
five other public housing developments-T.B. Watkins, Wayne Miner,
Chouteau Courts, West Bluff, and Pennway. 7 When the Housing Authority
tried to racially integrate Riverview and Guinotte in 1973, a "tipping"' 8 effect
occurred and by 1977, the Housing Authority stipulated that Riverview was 70%
12. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 99.010-.230 (1994).
13. Mo. REv. STAT. § 99.134 (1994).
14. Rhonda Chriss Lokeman, Editorial, Public Housing ProblemsPersist,KAN.

CITY STAR, July 8, 1993, at C6.
15. 87 F.R.D. 642 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 652-53.
18. Id. at 653. "Tipping" is the sociological phenomenon where white families
abandon residential neighborhoods after a certain percentage of minority residents join
the neighborhood. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, IntegrationMaintenance: The
UnconstitutionalityofBenign Programsthat DiscourageBlack Entry to Prevent White

Flight, 1981 DuKE L.J. 891, 893-97.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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non-white; Guinotte was 34% white, 46% African-American, 19% other nonwhite, and 3% Latino; and the remaining five projects were 98-100% AfricanAmerican.' 9 But in 1980, Federal District Court Judge Russell Clark dismissed
the Vann segregation litigation as moot because the Housing Authority reformed
its admissions practices subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit."
Despite the end of explicit racial steering, centralized public housing and
extreme white flight to the suburbs of Kansas City combined to make Kansas
City one of the most segregated cities in the nation. A seminal housing study in
1980 defined Kansas City as one of sixteen "hypersegregated" cities as
determined by five factors-uneven distribution of races, isolation, clustering,
concentration, and centralization.2' In the 1980s, few white residents lived in
non-suburban Kansas City, and almost none lived in public housing.
Julie Levin, the managing attorney at Legal Aid of Western Missouri,
works closely with public housing residents on their everyday legal issues such
as benefits and family law. Levin has also been actively involved with several
class actions against the Housing Authority starting with the Vann litigation in
1976.2 Through her ongoing interaction with public housing tenants, Levin
became aware of the horrifics conditions at public housing complexes such as
T.B. Watkins. Levin personally investigated the situation at T.B. Watkins and

attempted to negotiate improvements with the Housing Authority. By 1989, it
was apparent that negotiations would not protect her clients, so Levin returned
to the federal courts in search of redress from the Housing Authority, Authority
Director Mike Fisher, the United States Department of Housing and Urban

19. See Vann, 87 F.R.D. at 652-54.
20. Id. at 657-58.
21. DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 74-75 (1993).
22. Interview with Julie Levin, Managing Attorney of Legal Aid of Western
Missouri, in Kansas City, Mo. (Apr. 1, 1999). Levin has spent twenty-two years battling
the Housing Authority. She estimates that she filed six to seven class actions against the
Housing Authority after Vann. See, e.g., Todd v. Housing Auth. of Kan. City, No. 840852CV-W-JWO (W.D. Mo. filed 1984). The Todd class consisted of all applicants for
public housing whose applications had been or would be denied by the Housing
Authority. In October 1988, the Housing Authority settled the Todd class action and
entered into a consent decree promising to improve its administrative procedures for
determining the ineligibility of applicants for public housing. See Consent Decree, Todd
(No. 84-0852CV-W-JWO).
23. In a recent article, Doletha Tinsley described the pre-litigation conditions in her
housing development, T.B. Watkins. She lived on a "urine-damp hallway" filled with
"gangbangers" and "crack addicts" while gunfire could be heard outside. Rodents
infested her apartment. Police responding to a call from T.B. Watkins traveled in threes,
and one officer always carried a shotgun to protect them from snipers. Residents were
afraid for their lives. See Ruth E. Igoe, The Casefor Change, KAN. CrrY STAR MAG.,
May 21, 2000, at 12, 12-17 [hereinafter Igoe, The Casefor Change]; Ruth E. Igoe,
Activist Works ForSense of Community, KAN. CITY STAR, Feb. 23, 2000, at 7 (Connie
Flowers describes the fear she felt living in Kansas City public housing in 1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 2
MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 65

Development ("HUD"), and HUD Secretary Jack Kemp. The Tinsley class
action,' filed on February 9, 1989, focused on the one project-T.B.
Watkins-that presented the most desperate need for modernization and reform.
The named plaintiffs were five single, African-American mothers living in T.B.
Watkins and one homeless woman on the public housing waiting list.
At the time of the complaint, T.B. Watkins had 118 vacant units out of 288
total units, up from only 35 vacant units the year before. Residents alleged that
the conditions of T.B. Watkins exposed them to drug dealers, arsonists, and
trespassers who inhabited the vacant units and interior hallways.25 Many of the
vacant units had been stripped of window frames, appliances, and cabinets, and
were filled with trash, human waste, rats, and insects.26 Furthermore, the
plaintiffs claimed that the housing conditions placed their lives in danger.27 The
Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program ("CIAP") study undertaken
by the Housing Authority in May 1988 confirmed the problems asserted by the
plaintiffs.28 In the CLAP, the Housing Authority described T.B. Watkins as a
high-density development with a vacancy rate of fifty-six percent, "severe"
physical problems such as 151 uninhabitable units, "severe" crime problems
evidenced by eleven police reports a month for crimes ranging from homicide
to drug trafficking, and a stigma among residents as a dangerous public housing
development." In 1988, the Housing Authority estimated that it would take
nearly ten million dollars to modernize T.B. Watkins.3" Neither HUD nor the
Housing Authority had the funds available to undertake such a capital
improvement campaign.
B. The Tinsley Complaint: 1989
The Tinsley Complaint asserted several causes of action for the T.B.
Watkins residents. First, the plaintiffs argued that the Housing Authority's
neglect of the conditions at T.B. Watkins amounted to "de facto demolition" of
the units without satisfying the regulatory requirements for demolition prescribed
in the Fair Housing Act." Section 1437p requires approval by HUD, and HUD
cannot grant approval unless the Housing Authority consults tenants in the

24. The complaint sought certification of the class of all residents of T.B. Watkins

and all members of the Housing Authority's one thousand person waiting list for public
housing.
25.
26.
27.

Plaintiffs' Complaint, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1).
Id. 35-38.
Id.
Id.

28. Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program ("CIAP") Report,
Attachment No. I to Consent Decree at 7-13, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1).
29. Id.

30. Id. at 13.
31. See Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F. Supp. 1001, 1003, 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1990).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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decision to demolish 32 and then assists displaced tenants in finding safe,
affordable housing.33 The plaintiffs asserted the de facto demolition claim
against the Housing Authority and its director as a Section 1983 action.34 The
use of the de facto demolition argument was novel at the time, but Judge Dean
Whipple, the federal district judge randomly assigned to the Tinsley matter,
inherent
agreed that there was a private cause of action for de facto demolition
3
in Section 1437p and rejected the defendants' motion to dismiss. 1
A second main prong of the plaintiffs' complaint was a claim against the
Housing Authority, HUD, and HUD Secretary Jack Kemp that the neglect and
disrepair of T.B. Watkins had a disparate impact on minority residents, in

violation of the prohibition against discrimination in the provision of housing
facilities under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.36 As with numerous
other aspects of the 1964 Act, Title VIII plaintiffs need not show discriminatory
intent on the part of the Housing Authority; a finding of disparate impact on

racial minorities is sufficient to sustain a claim.37 Since almost all residents of
T.B. Watkins were historically and are currently African-American, the
Judge Whipple denied the defendants'
discriminatory impact seemed a truism. 38
39
motion to dismiss the Title VIII claim.
The other claims asserted in the Tinsley complaint were an Administrative
Procedures Act ("APA") claim and a Title VI claim against all defendants for

32. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b)(1) (1994).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b)(2) (1994).
34. See Tinsley, 750 F. Supp. at 1003.
35. Id. at 1009. See Concerned Tenants Ass'n of Father Panik Village v. Pierce,
685 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D. Conn. 1988) (finding cause of action for de facto demolition
under § 1437p). But see Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(finding § 1437p is limited to actual demolition, not applicable to de facto demolition).
For an academic discussion of the de facto demolition argument, see Julia Clayton
Powell, De FactoDemolition: The Hidden Deteriorationof PublicHousing,44 CATH.
U. L. REV. 885 (1995) (praising the approach taken by the courts in Kansas City and
Connecticut). After Tinsley, the Chester, Pennsylvania public housing tenants
successfully asserted a de facto demolition claim. See Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp.
1257, 1270-71 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Similarly, the residents of the District of Columbia
Housing Authority successfully sustained a de facto demolition claim. See Pearson v.
Kelly, No. 94-CA-14030 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1994) declares it unlawful to "discriminate against any
person... in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of
race, color, religion, sex ......
37. See, e.g., Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996); Soules
v. HUD, 967 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1992).
38. See Plaintiffs' Complaint 46, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1) (stating that
99% of T.B. Watkins residents were non-white and historically, T.B. Watkins had been
predominantly non-white). All named plaintiffs were African-American.
39. Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F. Supp. 1001, 1011 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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racial discrimination by a federally funded government agency.4 Judge Whipple
dismissed the Title VI claim because of the plaintiffs' failure to sustain their
burden of showing that the Housing Authority and HUD intentionally treated
racial minorities "less favorably" because of their race4 The plaintiffs asked the
court for an injunction halting the de facto demolition and mandating the
immediate rehabilitation of all vacant units, an injunction against action creating
discriminatory impact, ongoing jurisdiction over the remedial process, and
attorney's fees.42
C. ConsentDecree: Negotiation & Settlement: 1990-1991
The defendants fought hard for their motion to dismiss throughout 1989, but
once the court denied the bulk of the motion to dismiss, settlement negotiations
began in earnest and lasted for most of 1990. The two main issues under
consideration in the negotiations were the modernization of T.B. Watkins and
various desegregation remedies. The defendants resisted compromise on both
prongs,43 but ultimately the parties reached agreement. On November 25, 1991,
Judge Whipple approved the Consent Decree.
The Tinsley Consent Decree primarily provided for the modernization of
T.B. Watkins. HUD agreed to fund the project according to the CLAP
guidelines, estimated at eleven million dollarsm 4 The Housing Authority agreed
to hire an architectural firm to design a plan that would make T.B. Watkins safe
and "viable" for twenty years.45 Moreover, the Housing Authority agreed not to
demolish the entire T.B. Watkins development until after November 2011 . The
Consent Decree also sought to increase the occupancy rate at T.B. Watkins. The
Consent Decree outlined an extensive promotional campaign that would
publicize the improvements and modernization of T.B. Watkins.47 In addition,

40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994) prohibits discrimination by any program receiving
federal financial assistance.
41. Tinsley, 750 F. Supp. at 1011-12. The Tinsley complaint did not allege
intentional discrimination, rather it claimed mere "discriminatory impact" which Judge
Whipple held was insufficient to sustain a Title VI claim. Plaintiffs' Complaint 93,
Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1).
42. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 21-22, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1).
43. Telephone Interview with Julie Levin, Managing Attorney of Legal Aid of
Western Missouri, in Kansas City, Mo. (Jan. 27, 1999).
44. Consent Decree 3C, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1).
45. Id. 3A. The defendants promised rehabilitation of all 288 units as well as the
playground, park areas, landscaping, outside lighting, and security. Defendants also
promised to hire security guards for T.B. Watkins. Id. 3B.
46. Id. 3F.
47. Id. 4. The Consent Decree detailed everything from when press conferences
should be held, to how tours for interested applicants should be handled. The
promotional campaign was to continue until T.B. Watkins reached an occupancy rate of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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the marketing effort promised to increase community awareness of the viability
of public housing, with an aim to correcting the negative public image created
by years of neglect and decay in Kansas City public housing developments. A
related goal of the marketing campaign was to increase the number of nonminority public housing residents.49
A third focus of the Consent Decree was desegregation. This was a
problematic prong of negotiations because the Housing Authority's resident
population was comprised almost entirely of minority residents at the time of the
Consent Decree. Moreover, because there was no finding of liability, the
plaintiffs' counsel had to be creative in designing a remedy to which the
defendants would consent.5 ° The primary desegregative solution in the Consent
Decree was the marketing campaign discussed above, aimed at desegregating the
resident population by attracting non-minority residents to the public housing
system.5 Once the non-minority residents were attracted into the public housing
system, the Consent Decree ordered the Housing Authority to develop a
voluntary transfer program to encourage tenants in developments where their
race was a majority to transfer to developments where their race was a
minority.52 Transfer tenants were to get priority on a waiting list over new

applicants, but only after emergency applicants and under- and over-housed

90%. Id.
48. Id. 7C.
49. Id. 7. The target group for the marketing campaign was "families of the race
which is least likely to apply for any of the housing programs administered by [the
Housing Authority]." Id. 7B. The Consent Decree details the types of marketing (i.e.,
brochures, posters, etc.), the content of the materials, and even suggests where the
materials should be distributed. The marketing campaign also focused on increasing the
number of Section 8 landlords in "non-racially impacted census tracts within [the
Housing Authority's] jurisdiction." Id. 7A.
50. Interview with Julie Levin, supra note 22.
51. As an interesting side note, this solution in 1991 foreshadowed the
"desegregative attractiveness" rationale struck down in 1995 by the United States
Supreme Court with regard to Kansas City's magnet school system. See Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 94 (1995) (holding that "desegregative attractiveness" is an
impermissible goal and "beyond the scope of [the court's] broad remedial authority").
Kansas City and the State of Missouri poured millions of dollars into transforming all
junior and senior high schools in the city into magnet schools with superior facilities and
specialized themes. The hope was the magnet schools would attract white suburban
students into the predominantly African-American Kansas City School District. But see
Hill v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 298 (1976) (finding that a metropolitan remedy is not
per se impermissible where the segregative tactics extended outside the Chicago city
limits). It is important to note, however, that Gautreaux remedies aimed to push
scattered-site public housing developments outside the Chicago limits rather than the

Kansas City strategy in schools and public housing of pulling non-minority suburban
residents into the city.

52. Consent Decree 5D, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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tenants. 3 The final effort of the desegregation remedial scheme was for HUD
to request desegregation assistance from other public housing authorities and all
HUD assisted non-public housing owners in the Kansas City Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area.54
Fourth, the Consent Decree set up a mechanism to monitor compliance.
Every three months, the defendant Housing Authority was required to give
plaintiffs' counsel access to all applicant files and to Housing Authority property
in order to inspect rehabilitation work.'5 The Housing Authority promised to file
an annual report detailing the status of their compliance, 6 and every three
months, the defendants agreed to file a report with plaintiffs' counsel outlining
progress on all obligations under the Consent Decree. 7 The court retained
jurisdiction over the case for purposes of adjudicating any dispute over
compliance." Finally, the Consent Decree ordered the Housing Authority to pay
ninety-five thousand dollars in attorney's fees and noted that none of the
attorney's fees would be borne by HUD. 9
D. A Tale ofRecalcitrance,Resistance, andFrustration:1991-1993

After the court entered the Tinsley Consent Decree, there was disagreement
and tension among the defendants. HUD classified Kansas City as a "troubled"
housing authority and began evaluating the possibility of taking over the
Housing Authority. Because of its perception of extreme mismanagement at the
Housing Authority, HUD refused to release the eleven million dollars for
renovation to which it had agreed in the Tinsley Consent Decree.' Finally, in
late May 1992, Kansas City agreed to turn the Housing Authority over to HUD,
and HUD in turn released thirty-two million dollars for Housing Authority
improvements, including the Tinsley modernization. 6'

53. Id.

54. Id.
8-9. The Kansas City Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
encompassed the many suburban and rural municipalities surrounding Kansas City. This
provision had little teeth because the contiguous public housing authorities were not
parties to the litigation so were not bound by the Consent Decree. The Supreme Court
struck down interdistrict remedies in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)
(forbidding interdistrict school busing plan).
55. Consent Decree 13, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1).
56. Id.
57. Id. 17. The Consent Decree also outlined an extensive list of documents that
HUD and the Housing Authority were required to make available to the plaintiffs for
purposes of monitoring compliance. Id. 14-15.
58. Id. 18.
59. Id. 22.
60. April D. McClellan & Diane Stafford, Resignation ofHousing Official Urged,
KAN. CrrY STAR, Dec. 5, 1991, at C8.

61. April D. McClellan, Public Housing in Kansas City to Get $32 Million, KAN.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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During this struggle to gain access to HUD funds, Judge Whipple granted
plaintiffs' May 5, 1992 motion for contempt.62 Then in July 1992, Legal Aid
attorney Julie Levin filed Boles v. Cisneros,63 a new class action against the
Housing Authority asserting the same "de facto demolition" claims as Tinsley,
but on behalf of the Riverview housing development tenants. Kansas City's
Riverview development boasted a fifty-five percent vacancy rate, dangerous
structural deterioration, and a high crime rate because of the prevalence of vacant
units.6 Local HUD officials, now charged with running the Housing Authority,
criticized the filing of Boles litigation as a "waste of staff's time.""5 Despite this
criticism, the Boles litigation settled on February 23, 1993. In the Boles Decree,
the Housing Authority agreed to perform comprehensive modernization of
Riverview, and HUD pledged ten and a half million dollars to finance the

rehabilitation.66

As highlighted by the problems at Riverview, even under HUD
management, the Housing Authority remained dysfunctional and in need of
extensive organizational reform. By 1993, the vacancy rate of the Housing
Authority was the second worst in the nation, and two years after the Tinsley
Consent Decree, no modernization had been carried out at T.B. Watkins.67 One
million of the eleven and a half million dollars released by HUD was gone, and
no one at the Housing Authority could account for how it had been spent.68
After a year of unsuccessful management, HUD returned the Housing Authority
to the City in May 1993, and Kansas City Mayor Emanuel Cleaver appointed his
top aide, Luther Washington, as the interim executive director. At the same

CrrY STAR, May 22, 1992, at C1.

62. Judge Whipple ruled on the contempt motion on December 22, 1992. Court's
Docket Sheet 128, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1). Reasons cited in the January
contempt order were failure to implement the publicity campaign to both publicize
modernization and promote a positive image of public housing, failure to offer tours of
T.B. Watkins, failure to reconfigure waiting list policies in accordance with the Consent
Decree, failure to submit progress reports, and refusal to pay attorney's fees. Court's
Contempt Order at 2-4, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1). Apparently, none of the
defendants opposed the finding of contempt. See John T. Dauner, HousingAuthority
Has Not Lived Up To Edict, Court Rules, KAN. CrrY STAR, Dec. 22, 1992, at A8.

63. Boles v. Cisneros, No. 92-0526-CV-W-9 (W.D. Mo. filed July 7, 1992).
64. MROP Application for Riverview Housing Development (on file with author).
65. Dan Margolies, Public Housing Tenants Formalize Impatience, KAN. CITY

Bus. J., Aug. 7, 1992, at 9.
66. Consent Decree 4, Boles (No. 92-0526-CV-W-9). The remainder of the Boles
Consent Decree is similar to the terms of Tinsley, except that it does not provide for a
voluntary transfer program or encouragement of cooperation from suburban landlords
and contiguous housing authorities. Boles was not a desegregation case.
67. See Jeffrey Spivak, PublicHousing'sRise and Fall,KAN. CITY STAR, July 11,
1993, at BI.
68. Tom Jackman & Jeffrey Spivak, Housing Authority Put in Receivership, KAN.
CITY STAR, July 7, 1993, at Al.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 2

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 65

time, Julie Levin filed a second contempt motion69 and on July 2, 1993, Judge
Whipple issued an order to show cause why the Housing Authority was not in
contempt.70 Natalie Coe, general counsel of the Housing Authority, signed a
stipulation conceding that the Housing Authority had fallen short of its Consent
Decree obligations.7' In an interview, Coe stated, "'We had not paid the legal
fees and we had not started construction. Ethically, I could not make a good
faith argument that we had done that."' 72 With that stipulation came the wrath
of Judge Whipple and the ultimate sanction-the imposition of receivership.73

E. Receivership, Phase One: 1993-1994
On July 6, 1993, Judge Whipple found the Housing Authority in contempt
and placed it in receivership.74 He appointed Magistrate Judge Robert Larsen as
special master to oversee the search for a permanent receiver, and he named Joe
James, Regional Counsel for HUD, as interim director to assist Magistrate Judge

69. Plaintiffs' Motion for Court Order Adjudicating Hous. Auth. of Kan. City in
Contempt, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1). The plaintiffs' motion set forth areas of
noncompliance that included the lack of modernization on T.B. Watkins, the lack of
renovation of newly vacant units, the refusal to place tenants in the developments with
the least vacancies, and the lack of document production in accordance with monitoring
provisions in the Consent Decree. The plaintiffs also indicated that they had information
that "fraud and embezzlement [were] taking place at the Housing Authority. Such
activity would jeopardize the funds allocated for the rehabilitation of T.B. Watkins." Id.
8. After the judge threw the Housing Authority into receivership, it became public that
the FBI was conducting an ongoing investigation of fraud by Housing Authority
personnel. This investigation was only tangentially related to the Tinsley lawsuit or
remedy. Interview with Julie Levin, supra note 22.
70. Order to Show Cause, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1).
71. Parties' Joint Stipulation of Fact, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1). Julie Levin,
Natalie Coe, and Alleen Castellani, Assistant United States Attorney for the HUD
defendants, signed the stipulation, which set forth the details of the Housing Authority's
noncompliance. Id.
72. Bill Norton, Attorney Focus in Takeover ofHousingAgency, KAN. CITY STAR,
July 24, 1993, at Cl.
73. See Jackman & Spivak, supranote 68, at Al.
74. Judge Whipple's contempt order cited several reasons for the sanction. First,
no construction had begun at T.B. Watkins. Court's Contempt Order l(a), Tinsley (No.
89-0023-CV-W-1). Second, vacancies occurred regularly at T.B. Watkins, yet the
Housing Authority made no effort to rehabilitate the units and turn them into habitable
units. Id. l(b). Third, the Housing Authority was not placing tenants where there were
the most vacancies as dictated by the Consent Decree. Id. 1(c). Finally, the Housing
Authority did not make application to HUD for making exceptions to fair market rents
up to 120% for the Section 8 certificate program in non-racially identifiable areas. Id.
1(d). All reasons for contempt were based on noncompliance with the Tinsley Consent
Decree. The court also held the Housing Authority in contempt of the January 1993
contempt order for failing to pay attorney's fees to Legal Aid. Id. 2.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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Larsen in the day-to-day operations of the Housing Authority.75

667

The

receivership stripped the Board of Commissioners of its power and removed
Luther Washington, the Housing Authority's new Executive Director.7 6 Upon
issuing the order, Judge Whipple immediately dispatched the United States
Marshals to the Housing Authority offices to take possession of the agency, and
he issued a restraining order banning all Housing Authority employees from the
office until invited to return to work by the receiver.77
City and Housing Authority officials reacted with shock, and focused their
criticism on Natalie Coe's authority to sign the stipulation.7 Washington and the
ousted Commissioners expressed confusion about the purpose of the hearing and
surprise that the hearing following the July Fourth weekend had such extreme
implications.7 9 Mayor Emanuel Cleaver, in a meeting with the Kansas City Star
Editorial Board after the court's ruling, expressed his "vehement" disagreement
with the receivership order.8" Cleaver, Kansas City's first African-American
Mayor, was new to office and had just appointed his top aide to run the Housing
Authority. As a resident of public housing growing up, Mayor Cleaver
expressed his frustration that he would not be given an opportunity to effectuate
change at the Housing Authority.8' Another voice of dissent regarding the
receivership came from three resident leaders who decried the move as racist
because it displaced Luther Washington and other African-American Housing

Authority officials.82

Despite this opposition, an overwhelming number of public housing
residents supported the court's intervention. The resident leaders that dubbed the

75. Receivership Order, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1). The court had originally
appointed Joe James as the receiver, but rescinded that order because under 28 U.S.C. §
958 (1994), federal employees cannot be receivers. Instead, the court adopted the
temporary solution of appointing Magistrate Judge Larsen as special master under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1994) until a non-federal receiver could be appointed.
76. Receivership Order, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1).
77. Court's Contempt Order 8-9, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1).
78. Coe later became the target of vituperative criticism about her role in signing
the stipulation and resigned from the Housing Authority one month later. See Norton,
supra note 72, at Cl.
79. See Norton, supra note 72, at Cl.
80. See Tom Jackman, Housing Offices Searched by FBI, KAN. CITY STAR, July
8, 1993, at Al.

81. This being said, Cleaver was on the City Council prior to becoming Mayor and
yet he had no positive impact on the Housing Authority's problems.
82. A tenant leader said in an interview, "'[w]hen black people try to control our
own destiny, some white people come along and try to take it away."' Of the eight
people not called back to work after the receivership order, seven were AfricanAmerican, including Luther Washington. The tenant leaders called on the black
community to join them in protest against Judge Whipple's order. See Bill Norton,
Tenant Leaders Oppose Takeover of Kansas City Authority, KAN. CITY STAR, July 29,
1993, at C4.
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move racist were a small voice in a sea of support from the largely AfricanAmerican resident population.83 Judge Whipple held a public hearing two days
after imposing receivership."4 The courtroom was packed with residents, and all
who spoke about the receivership remedy praised the court's action. The Kansas
City Star reporter covering the hearing described, "The response [to Judge
Whipple's action] was unanimous: Hallelujah and thank you, Judge!"8 s One
resident exclaimed: "'We, the residents, feel like a black cloud has been lifted
from over our heads."' 86 Press coverage of the move also lauded the judge's
extreme action. The Editorial Board of the Kansas City Star supported the
remedial choice, imploring the court to finally fix the city's troubled public
housing system.87
Nevertheless, the receivership began inauspiciously, with the release of a
federal study indicating that of forty-four large problem-plagued public housing
authorities in the United States, Kansas City's was the worst.88 The temporary
receiver, a HUD attorney, and the special master, a busy magistrate judge with
a full docket, faced a formidable challenge of reforming the floundering public
agency using largely the same staff.89 By all accounts, James and Magistrate
83. Four tenant leaders responded to criticisms of receivership and dismissed race
as a factor in the judge's decision. These leaders lauded Judge Whipple's decision as
"courageous and necessary." The tenant leaders noted that Judge Whipple brought in Joe
James, an African-American, as the interim receiver. See Bill Norton, Tenants Divided
on Receivership, KAN. CITY STAR, July 31, 1993, at C3.

84. Tom Jackman, Many Gratefulto Judge, KAN. CrIY STAR, July 10, 1993, at C1.
85. Jackman, supranote 84, at Cl.
86. Jackman, supra note 84, at C1.
87. See Lokeman, supranote 14, at C6. The opening of the editorial teases:

Reportedly there is a white horse hitched to a post in front of the T.B.
Watkins public housing development in Kansas City. It's the horse that U.
S. District Judge Dean Whipple rode in on. Whipple wants to rescue Watkins
and other distressed properties in the Kansas City Public Housing Authority
from the dragons of politics and waste.
Lokeman, supranote 14, at C6.
88. See Special Master's Report on the Status of Housing Authority's Compliance
with Consent Decree, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1). Magistrate Judge Larsen cited the
Annual Public Housing Assessment Program's scoring report which gave the Housing
Authority a score of 17.95 out of 100, the lowest score of any housing authority in the
United States. See also Bill Norton, A HousingAgency in Chaos, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar.
28, 1994, at Al. Norton reported that the Housing Authority "resemble[d] a leaky boat
sinking in a sea of cash. Never in its history ha[d] the authority had so much to spend:
More than $106 million to manage the agency... [b]ut because of mismanagement and
staff turnover, it's never been in worse shape." Id.
89. After Judge Whipple's restraining order temporarily banning all employees
from returning to work after the imposition of the receivership, 40-50% of Housing
Authority employees were called back to work the next day by Joe James. See Jackman,
supra note 80, at Al. By late August, all but seven of the Housing Authority's over two
hundred employees were recalled to work. The employees not invited to return were the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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Judge Larsen failed to ensure compliance with the Tinsley and Boles Consent
Decrees. An editorial six months after the imposition of the receivership
described the Housing Authority as "still an absolute mess."" After eight
months of receivership, only minor construction had been completed-a
recreation center of unknown cost. 9' As of March 1994, there was no
modernization at T.B. Watkins or Riverview, and the Housing Authority
Projects'92 Coordinator described the Housing Authority as a "three ringed
circus."

When the agreement with temporary receiver Joe James expired on
February 15, 1994, it fell to Magistrate Judge Larsen to manage the day-to-day
operations of the agency while searching for a replacement director. It was
against this backdrop that Mayor Cleaver presented a five-point plan to the court
requesting that the Housing Authority be returned to city control. 93 Cleaver's
proposed terms included: (1) retaining a national housing law expert and a team
of housing consultants, (2) appointing a ninety-day interim director, (3)
conducting a national search for a permanent director, (4) appointing a
committee of housing experts to advise the mayor, and (5) eventually turning this
advisory committee into a new Board of Commissioners.94 This plan was the
first public statement on housing from Mayor Cleaver since the receivership was
imposed. Magistrate Judge Larsen expressed skepticism about the plan, and
Judge Whipple rejected it without expressing a reason.95 Next, a relatively
unknown figure, Paula Schwach, was named interim receiver.96 Schwach was
the ninth director of the Housing Authority since the Tinsley Consent Decree.
Five months later, Schwach resigned.97 By the time Schwach left, the T.B.
Watkins project's occupancy rate under receivership had plummeted to a
shocking thirty percent.

top officials, such as Luther Washington, Cleaver's recent appointment as interim
director. See Bill Norton, FourHousingAuthority Employees Jobs On-Line, KAN. CrrY
STAR, Aug. 28, 1993, at C2.
90. Rhonda Chriss Lokeman, Editorial, Care Forthe Tenants, KAN. CrrY STAR,
Dec. 20, 1993, at B4. The editorial laments that judicial intervention is "straying" and
that "despite the court's expression of good intentions, not much has been done." Id.
91. See Norton, supranote 88, at Al.
92. See Norton, supranote 88, at Al.
93. See Bill Norton, Cleaver Hopes Housing Shifts to City Control, KAN. CrrY
Feb. 17, 1994, at 1. There is no indication on the Tinsley docket that the Mayor
filed the plan with the court. Julie Levin stated that the plan was never taken seriously
STAR,

or given a public hearing. Interview with Julie Levin, supra note 22. It is unclear
whether and how Mayor Cleaver actually presented the plan to the court. It may have
been primarily a press release intended for the community and the media.
94. See Norton, supranote 93, at 1.
95. See Norton, supranote 93, at 1.
96. Around Kansas City, KAN. CrrY STAR, June 30, 1994, at C2.
97. Around KansasCity, supranote 96, at C2.
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The failure of the first phase of receivership can be attributed to James,
Schwach, and Magistrate Judge Larsen's lack of both management and public
housing expertise, as well as their shortage of time to devote to the extensive
reforms needed at the Housing Authority. The Phase One receivership raises
issues of institutional competence-whether a temporary, court-appointed
director can truly generate the momentum needed to effectuate change in a
broken organization. It illustrates how much the success of receivership
remedies turns on the capabilities and resources of the receiver. In his annual
report to the court at the end of 1993, Magistrate Judge Larsen emphasized that
"the crucial need for a sophisticated executive director in a contemporary
housing authority cannot be overstated."98 Moreover, the first phase receivers
operated in a state of ambiguity-staff, vendors, business leaders, and tenants
knew this was a temporary situation and no one could predict what would
happen next. It is difficult to inspire loyalty from employees, generate
confidence among lenders, maintain control over contractors, and create
significant organizational change within this limited, temporary context. To ask
these Phase One receivers to be responsible for the Housing Authority's reform
would be similar to placing the burden for reforming failing schools on the
shoulders of a substitute teacher.
F. Receivership, Phase Two: 1994-Present
When Schwach resigned in July 1994, Magistrate Judge Larsen and Judge
Whipple launched a more vigorous national search for a permanent receiver who
would bring management and housing expertise to the Housing Authority. The
special master appointed an Advisory Committee of more than a dozen
individuals who screened seventeen bids for the receivership position." After
interviewing finalists, Magistrate Judge Larsen recommended TAG Associates
('TAG"), a for-profit Boston management consulting firm specializing in public
housing management and reform."° TAG had experience working with various
failed housing authorities in Boston, D.C., and San Francisco, but had never
served as a receiver.' °'
TAG President Jeffrey Lines met with Judge Whipple and expressed
concern about the prior model where the receiver reported to the special master.
Lines speculated that after a year of failure under receivership, the court was
eager to get the Housing Authority fixed; as a result, Judge Whipple told TAG

98. Special Master's Report on the Status of the Housing Authority's Compliance
with Consent Decree at 15, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1). Magistrate Judge Larsen

concluded his report by urging the court to appoint a permanent receiver. Id. at 48.
99. See Tom Jackman, KC.Housing Receiver is Named, KAN. CITY STAR, Aug.
26, 1994, at Cl.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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that they could have full authority to act as long as they were accountable for
failure."° Judge Whipple made it clear to Lines that TAG would be expected to
stay on board unless the court directed the company to leave, and the court could
fire TAG at any time. 03 On September 6, 1994, Judge Whipple appointed TAG
as receiver of the Housing Authority, conferring on it full power to contract, hire,
fire, and administer the funds of the Housing Authority."' The court endowed
the receiver with all the legal immunities vested in a member of the court.105 To
monitor the receivers, Judge Whipple asked TAG to submit a twelve month
strategic plan for the Housing Authority's first year. 0 6 Thereafter, the receiver
was to supply the court monthly reports outlining action taken and funds spent."°
The receivership order made no provisions for when the receivership would
end,
28
but said only that the "receiver will serve at the pleasure of this court.' 0
The community's initial reaction to the appointment of TAG was guardedly
optimistic. TAG's first move was to hire Eugene Jones as the Executive
Director. Jones, a 38-year old African-American man with years of experience
both as a HUD auditor and most recently with the San Francisco Housing
Authority, was the twenty-second director in a decade at the Housing
Authority,0 9 and he found the business community to be particularly skeptical
about yet another director coming through the revolving door."0 However, the
Housing Authority's residents and staff welcomed him when it was immediately
apparent that he was going to take action and be a hands-on leader.1 ' Within his
first few days on the job, Jones toured Housing Authority developments talking
with residents and staff and responding to problems.' Residents had never seen
a director show such interest and enthusiasm; as a result, they embraced Jones
and supported his new leadership."'

102. Interview with Jeffrey Lines, President of TAG Associates, in Norwood,
Mass. (Feb. 12, 1999).
103. Id.
104. Receivership Order, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1).
105. Id.
106. Id.

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Igoe, The Casefor Change, supranote 23, at 15.
110. Telephone Interview with Eugene Jones, former Executive Director of Kansas

City Housing Authority and current Executive Director of Indianapolis Housing
Authority (Mar. 19, 1999).
111. Id.
112. Jones' success through his active involvement in the field is comparable to
the activities of the Boston Housing Authority ("BHA") receiver, Harry Spence. For a
case study of the BRA receivership, see MOORE, supranote 6, at 241 (describing Harry
Spence as a "visible presence in the field" at least twice a week touring the properties).
113. Telephone Interview with Eugene Jones, supranote 110.
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After six weeks on the job, Jones had set up participatory forums for
residents, increased security, unlocked languishing HUD funds, employed
resident crews to clean up trash at developments, held one-day skills training
seminars for Housing Authority staff, and transferred the staff offices from the
beleaguered Riverview development to a downtown office building." 4' HUD
released funds because of its growing confidence in TAG's management
abilities.' Elmer Binford, a HUD adviser and longtime critic of the Housing
Authority, said HUD gave Jones "'high marks"' for the impressive quickness
with which he "'established a presence and quieted things down."' ' 6 Within
weeks of TAG's appointment, a Kansas City Star editorial lauded the signs of
improvement apparent at the Housing Authority. 17 Jones brought an aggressive,
active management style to the Housing Authority, and the residents and staff
who had floundered for a decade without a real leader rallied to support him.
TAG submitted its first twelve month plan to the court in November 1994,
and the ambitious plan focused on creating a new decentralized management
structure, launching two new maintenance crews devoted exclusively to
repairing vacant units, hiring outside firms to perform different jobs rather than
one firm to fix an entire unit, modernizing the computer capabilities of the office,
and developing incentive pay structures for staff to encourage productivity and
quality standards." 8 By March 1995, progress was tangible-the Housing
Authority unveiled the first nine newly refurbished units at T.B. Watkins." 9 The
opening of these nine units was only a small step, as they were surrounded by
a development with a thirty-three percent occupancy rate, but it was a highly
visible step toward20 remedying the de facto demolition problem of the original
Tinsley litigation.1
The Phase Two receivership success confirms the lesson that the ability of
the receiver to provide hands-on leadership and credibility is a crucial element
for institutional reform. In Kansas City, Eugene Jones' capacity for managing

114. Jeffrey Spivak, Housing ChiefQuickly Makes His Mark in Kansas City:

Eugene JonesAdmits the TroubledAuthorityNeeds Much More Work, KAN.CITY STAR,
Oct. 24, 1994, at Bl. Jones, upon arrival, proclaimed that his mission was to turn around
one of the nation's most troubled housing agencies. He noted, "'I'm young, I'm
aggressive and I think I can do it. I'm destined to do it."' Id.
115. See Spivak, supranote 114, at B1.
116. Spivak, supranote 114, at B1.
117. E. Thomas McClanahan, Editorial, Signs ofImprovement, KAN. CITY STAR,
Oct. 27, 1994, at C6. The editorial notes that the biggest challenge facing Jones "will be
changing the character of the authority's bureaucracy." The editorial was hopeful, but
also adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Id.
118. Jeffrey Spivak, Housing Authority Pledges Influx of Families, KAN. CITY
STAR, Nov. 18, 1994, at C2.
119. Tracey Kaplan, A DesirablePlaceto Live at Watkins, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar.

2, 1995, at Cl.
120. Id.
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a public housing agency made receivership a viable tool. By the end of 1995,
Julie Levin, plaintiffs' counsel in Tinsley, told the press, "'We hope Gene Jones
never leaves.""... Jones continued as Executive Director of the Housing
Authority until May 1997 when he resigned to reform a different troubled
housing authority in Indianapolis."n By all accounts, Jones was an excellent
manager and created positive institutional change during his tenure as director."
TAG replaced Jones with Dallas Parks. 24 When Dallas Parks arrived, the
Housing Authority was nearly halfway through a $133 million capital
improvement campaign, which included large-scale renovations to T.B. Watkins,
Riverview, and Guinotte Manor.'25 In August 1998, the Housing Authority
opened a new 120 unit mixed income development on the former site of
Pennway Plaza. The new development, Villa Del Sol, signaled the future of the
Housing Authority. It combined sixty-five units of public housing with fifty-five
units of market-rate private housing."26 In terms of tangible progress, the
Housing Authority under receivership moved from the celebrated nine units at
T.B. Watkins in early 1995, to a massive overhaul of nearly all Housing
Authority facilities. In 1999, Kansas City had approximately 1,600 public

121. Tracey Kaplan, Public Housing Makes Gains Under PrivateManagement,

KAN. CrrY STAR, Sept. 5, 1995, at Al. The general tone of the article reported that things
were improving at the Housing Authority. Occupancy rates for the Housing Authority
as a whole increased from 57% to 63% in the year since Judge Whipple named TAG
receiver. Id. Upon this Author's visit to the TAG offices in Norwood, a plaque
displayed on the wall read: "To TAG & Associates. In appreciation of your aggressive
approach to overcome obstacles that have plagued the [Housing Authority] and
succeeding when no one else could. September 9, 1995. [Housing Authority] Residents
& Staff."
122. Telephone Interview with Eugene Jones, supra note 110.
123. Jones' leadership continued to be hands-on throughout his tenure at the
Housing Authority. A recent article by public housing advocates praised Jones' active
role, noting that he was "instrumental in creating a trusting relationship with the
residents. He would drive around the developments on weekends and evenings and just
stop and ask people what their problems were and write down the information. Within
two weeks, they would have a solution." Eric Scott, Putting Teeth Into Resident
Participation;HOUSING MATTERS (Pub. Hous. Residents' Nat'l Org. Campaign,
Washington, D.C.), Feb. 1999, at 7.
124. Interview with Jeffrey Lines, supra note 102.
125. See Glenn E. Rice, New Look, New Issuesfor Public Housing, KAN. CITY
STAR, Mar. 1, 1998, atB1.
126. See Glenn E. Rice, Public Housing Seeks Blend of Residents, KAN. CITY
STAR, Aug. 25, 1998, at B1. The Housing Authority continues its expansion into mixed
income developments. In April 2000, the Housing Authority purchased twelve acres in
Kansas City's Northland region and plans to build a one hundred unit development with
at least twenty units of public housing. See Ruth E. Igoe, Clay County Housing Interest
Revealed, KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 27,2000, at B4.
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housing units, with an anticipated 610 more redeveloped or new units expected
by 2001.127
While achieving success in management and construction, TAG maintains
consistent, open communication with the court. In advance of each calendar
year, TAG submits a twelve-month plan and budget to the court and plaintiffs'
counsel in accordance with the receivership order. " After reviewing the twelvemonth plan, the mayor, regional HUD officials, and the Public Housing
Residents Council 129 all submit comments to the court. 3 ' The court privately
considers the twelve-month plan and related comments and then decides whether
to renew TAG's year-to-year contract.' The TAG/Housing Authority director,
Jones and now Park, also meets with Judge Whipple twice a month, focusing
primarily on policy decisions and "big picture" plans rather than day-to-day
operations. Based on these frequent meetings, Jones described Judge Whipple
as an intelligent man of common sense who trusted the people he hired and gave
them his complete support.'32
In addition to its accountability to the court, TAG consistently solicits
feedback from residents and the greater Kansas City community. For instance,
TAG holds "receivership meetings" every two weeks where TAG President
Jeffrey Lines meets with interested tenants. These meetings are advertised to the
Housing Authority tenants, and usually have a representative or two from each
housing development. The receiver and plaintiffs' counsel use the meetings to
track compliance with different items in the Tinsley Consent Decree.'33 Lines

127. See Ruth E. Igoe, Spotlight on Public Housing, KAN. CrrY STAR, July 21,
1999, at B 1 (praising "dramatic improvements... made since receivership began"). For
example, the "urban village" mixed income housing redevelopment at Guinotte Manor
was heralded a success at its dedication in 1998 despite much controversy surrounding
its original architectural design. See Lynn Horsley, Making Progress,KAN. CITY STAR,
Dec. 24, 1998, at 10; see also Ruth E. Igoe, Singing Praisesof New Guinotte Manor,
KAN. CITY STAR, May 12, 2000, at B3 [hereinafter Igoe, Singing Praises].
128. Receivership Order 4, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1).
129. The Public Housing Residents Council ("PHRC") is an organization created
when the receivership began. It was initially led by Emily Wallace, now deceased. The
current leader is Connie Flowers. It is a strong organization of tenant representatives
from all Kansas City public housing developments. The PHRC has considerable contact
with the court directly as well as socially. Judge Whipple interacts with the PHRC at its
annual meeting over the twelve-month plan as well as attending its Summer Jamboree.
Interview with Julie Levin, supra note 22.
130. Telephone Interview with Eugene Jones, supranote 110; Interview with Julie
Levin, supranote 22.
13 1. There is no public hearing on the renewal of TAG's contract or the provisions
of the twelve-month plan or budget. Interview with Julie Levin, supra note 22.
132. Telephone Interview with Eugene Jones, supranote 110.
133. Interview with Julie Levin, supra note 22. A sample Agenda from the March
31, 1999 meeting indicates the discussion focused for five minutes on each of the ten
Kansas City public housing developments and also covered general topics such as
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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explained that TAG wanted "extreme accountability" on all aspects of
receivership management." Lines believes if people are continuously informed
of what is happening, and if decisions are made "in the light of day," they will
feel comfortable and not challenge decisions. 3 A national public housing
advocacy newsletter praises the "trusting relationship" built by Lines, due in part
to the receivership meetings where residents present reports on their
developments and get answers to their questions. 3 6 It is important to note that
this accountability was not mandated by the court; rather, it was the result of
TAG's open management style.
After a decade of litigation, reform, and remedial experimentation at the
Housing Authority, HUD recently gave the Housing Authority an "A" for their
1998 performance, citing the Housing Authority as a "high performer" in
maintenance and management.'37 This accolade can be contrasted with the "F"
the Housing Authority received in 1994 at the beginning of TAG's
receivership.' 38 The results of institutional reform at the Housing Authority are
positive and undisputable. 39 Part 11 will now consider the appropriateness and
implications for the methods used to achieve these outstanding results.

"Security" and "Resident Services."
134. Interview with Jeffrey Lines, supra note 102.
135. Interview with Jeffrey Lines, supra note 102. Lines also explained that for
every contract over $25,000, and every significant change in Housing Authority policy,
TAG holds a public meeting for any interested party to raise concerns. He reported that
few people come to these meetings despite efforts to publicize them. Interview with
Jeffrey Lines, supra note 102.
136. Scott, supra note 123, at 7. The interview is with Eric Scott, the director of
the HOPE VI program at the Housing Authority. Scott explains, "We have found that
as long as we do everything above the table and the residents underst[and] what our
limitations are, they are extremely understanding. It's only when we try to do something
behind the scenes and figure that they don't need to know that we have a real argument
and start working at cross purposes." Scott, supranote 123, at 7.
137. Ruth E. Igoe, K.C. Agency Makes HonorRoll After FlunkingFive Years Ago,
KAN. Crr STAR, May 6, 1999, at B9 [hereinafter Igoe, K.C. Agency Makes HonorRoll].
Dallas Parks attributes the success to "a team effort by a top-notch staff... [which]
start[ed] with the court-appointed receiver, Jeff Lines of TAG Associates, Inc. [and] the
residents who g[ave] staff their input . . . ." Id. Michael Sturmer, Director of
Development for the Housing Authority said, "'We still realize we have more work to
do and are going to continue improving."' Id. The Housing Authority received an
overall score of 90.25 out of 100 in 1998. In 1994, the Housing Authority received a
score of 43.98. The score, calculated by HUD, is a composite of performance in
operational areas such as maintenance response time, rent collections, security, capital
improvement, and financial management. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Igoe, The Case For Change, supra note 23; see also Igoe, Singing
Praises,supra note 127, at B3.
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I1. RECEIVERSHIP: AN EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIAL STEP

A. Legal Foundationfor Receivership Remedies
Receivership is a remedy with roots in the commercial arena. It is
traditionally employed to preserve property for creditors during bankruptcy,
corporate reorganization, or other litigation proceedings where the court finds the

corporate fiduciaries can not be trusted with the assets of the company pending
a decision by the court. 4 In the 1960s and 1970s, a few courts expanded
commercial receivership into the area of public institutional reform litigation.
Turner v. Goolsby' is the first known instance of a court employing the

receivership remedy to reform a public institution.'42 In Turner, the Taliaferro

County School District Superintendent secretly closed the county's white school

to avoid desegregation and bused all white students to neighboring county
schools on Taliaferro buses. This tactic left eighty-seven African-American
children, whose transfer to white schools instigated the resistance, with no
school to attend. The three judge district court, angered by the subversive tactics
of the county, placed the school in receivership and named the Georgia
Superintendent of Schools as the receiver. The Turner court found this move
necessary "to avoid irreparable injury to the white children which would result

from enjoining the use of public fuids for their education, and to preserve the
rights of 87 Negro applicants for transfer."'43
While scholars and lawyers often talk about "receivership" as a metaphor
for the invasiveness of institutional reform litigation,' 44 true remedial
140. For a discussion of the roots of the receivership remedy in the commercial
context, see Jason Feingold, The Case for Imposing Equitable Receiverships Upon
Recalcitrant Polluters, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 207 (1993) (exploring the

changing uses of receivership over the last two centuries from traditional "custodial"
business related receiverships to "remedial" receiverships in areas of prisons, housing,
and environmental law). See also James M. Hirschhom, Where The Money Is: Remedies
To FinanceCompliance With Strict StructuralInjunctions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1834
(1984).
141. 255 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ga. 1966).

142. For an early analysis of receivership as a remedy in institutional reform
litigation, see Note, Receivership as a Remedy in CivilRights Cases, 24 RUTGERS L. REV.
115 (1969).
143. Turner,255 F. Supp. at 730.
144. Several Supreme Court dissenting opinions raise the specter of "federal

receivership" as an example of how the Court exceeded its remedial authority in some
seminal school desegregation cases. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S.
449, 525 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo.,
413 U.S. 189, 257 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing court oversight of

desegregation as "what is in practice, a federal receivership"); Wright v. City of Emporia,
407 U.S. 451, 477 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting) ("While we have emphasized the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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receiverships are rarely imposed by courts. 45 Before continuing, it is important
to distinguish the "receiver" from other third party remedial tools. Of course,
anytime the court has ordered a detailed structural injunction, the discretion of
the defendants is constrained and the presence of any uninvited third-party is an
invasive influence on the organization. However, while the terminology is often
used interchangeably, there is a distinct difference between various third party
roles, sometimes grouped under the ubiquitous term "neoreceivers. ' '" "Special
masters" typically assist the court with the formulation of more detailed orders
or conduct evidentiary hearings on detailed preliminary factual matters. 47
"Monitors" typically act as surrogates for the plaintiff class to supervise
defendants' compliance with a court order.'8 True receivers are the only thirdparty brought in by the court to displace the defendants and assume the power
to run an institution, 49 raising unique concerns about the continuing Article HI
jurisdiction of federal courts to oversee litigation in which there is arguably no
longer a "case or controversy." In addition, special masters and monitors are
used as early, even as the first, remedial tools to achieve compliance, whereas
in public institutional reform litigation, receivership is usually a court's last ditch
remedial option. 5 ' The remedy imposed on the Kansas City Housing Authority
is a classic receivership-it displaced the Board of Commissioners and the
Executive Director and replaced them with a court appointed third-party who
controlled all aspects of the offending organization.
Power to displace government actors falls under judges' broad equity
powers to design a remedy best suited for the violation. As stated by the United
States Supreme Court in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard ofEducation,
"Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's

equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are

flexibility of the power of the district courts in this [post Brown Ildesegregative] process,
the invocation of remedial jurisdiction is not equivalent to having a school district placed
in receivership.").
145. For a listing of the fifteen known institutional reform litigation receiverships,
see supra note 5.
146. See Note, Equitable Remedies: An Analysis of Judicial Utilization of
Neoreceivershipsto Implement Large Scale InstitutionalChange, 1976 WIs. L. REV.
1161 (describes neoreceivers as a new remedial form involving a synthesis of receivers
who supervise and masters who advise).
147. See Hirschhorn, supra note 140, at 1821; see also Comment, Court-Created
Receivership Emergingas Remedy for PersistentNoncompliance with Environmental
Laws, 10 ENvrL. L. REP. 10059 n.11 (1980) (clarifying that special masters are different
from receivers in that special masters serve merely an advisory role).
148. See Hirschhorn, supra note 140, at 1821.
149. See Hirschhorn, supra note 140, at 1821.
150. See Robert E. Buckholz, Jr. et al., Special Project, The Remedial Process in
InstitutionalReform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 784, 837 n.437 (1978). See infra
note 157 (discussing test for imposing receivership).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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inherent in equitable remedies.''
Two federal circuits have affirmed the
appropriateness of receivership outside the traditional commercial context. In
Morgan v. McDonough,' the First Circuit approved the receivership for South
Boston High School in the midst of a protracted desegregation battle, finding
that "when the usual remedies are inadequate, a court of equity is justified,
particularly in aid of an outstanding injunction, in turning to less common ones,
such as receivership, to get the job done."'5 3 The District of Columbia Circuit
reversed an extraordinarily broad receivership order for the D.C. child welfare
system because it gave the receiver blanket authority to violate any local law
which interfered with the receiver's duties.' 5 4 However, in its analysis, the D.C.
Circuit assumed without challenge the validity of the receivership remedy as
within the District Court's equitable power.'
Because displacement of elected or appointed officials running a public
institution is the second most drastic remedial tool available to a judge, 6 it must
be ordered only when the violation justifies such an extraordinary response.
Courts can only use receivership as a mechanism of "last resort."' 7 Years of
defiance and recalcitrance speckled with contempt citations usually predate the
imposition of receivership. For example, in a case against the District of

151. 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
152. 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976)
153. Id. at 533.

154. See Lashawn v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
155. See id. Judge Silberman's opinion seems to assume the validity of the
receivership remedy and even the appropriateness of a receiver overriding local law
under more controlled circumstances. He writes, "[s]hould the district court determine
...that empowering the Receiver to violate District law in a specific instance is
warranted, it must identify the specific federal law ground it is using as the justification
for the Receiver's authority to transcend local law." Id. at 855.
156. The most drastic response available to the judge is the closure of a public
institution. Many courts, when deciding to impose a receivership, adopt the rhetorical
move of comparing that remedy with the more extreme option of shut-down. See, e.g.,
Morgan, 540 F.2d at 534; Shaw v. Allen, 771 F. Supp. 760, 763 (S.D. W. Va. 1990);
Newman v. State of Ala., 466 F. Supp. 628, 635 (M.D. Ala. 1979).
157. See Dixon v. Barry, 967 F. Supp. 535, 550 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting receivership
is appropriate only when there is no other remedy left); Shaw, 771 F. Supp. at 762
(finding receivership an "intrusive remedy which should only be resorted to in extreme
cases" where traditional remedies such as injunctions and contempt proceedings fail);
Newman, 466 F. Supp. at 635 (establishing that under the extraordinary circumstances,
the only alternative to noncompliance with the Court's order is the appointment of a
receiver); District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 738 A.2d 1206 (D.C. 1999) (reversing
receivership order because the trial court did not allow sufficient time for the new
superintendent to "turn the tide" in the new school year before ordering the "remedy of
last resort"); Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 400 N.E.2d. 1231, 1245, 1249 (Mass. 1980)
(finding the receivership option the judges "only remaining expedient" with any hope of
success; therefore, it was the remedy of "last resort").
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Columbia Housing Authority, a court-appointed special master conducted an
extensive year-long review before recommending receivership.'58 Upon
receiving the recommendation, the federal court ordered receivership, ending
thirty years of effort by public housing advocates, HUD oversight committees,
tenant protesters, and legislative reform. 159 Receivership was the "last resort" for
this troubled and dysfunctional housing authority.'60 An analysis of the
published receivership cases indicates that Judge Whipple in Tinsley was among

the quickest to impose the receivership remedy, ordering receivership after two
years of noncompliance under the Tinsley Consent Decree and with only one
prior contempt citation.'" Most judges struggled for six to ten years, through
numerous contempt citations, before determining that receivership was the only

remedial option remaining.'6 Much of the ultimate fate of the receivership remedy turns on the choice of
receiver.'63 The Tinsley Phase One receivership illustrates a failure of the

158. See Cunningham & Foley, supra note 6. For an additional example, before
Judge Garrity placed the Boston Housing Authority ("BHA") in receivership, he
appointed a special master to monitor the BHA, issued numerous interim injunctive
orders against the BHA, and helped litigants agree on terms of a consent decree that
would bind their conduct, but all to no avail. Plaintiffs repeatedly moved for
receivership, and Judge Garrity consistently denied these motions. After oier four years
of struggling with the proper remedial response to the violation of rights by the BHA,
Judge Garrity reluctantly imposed a receivership on the BHA. See Perez, 400 N.E.2d.
at 1236-51.
159. See Cunningham & Foley, supra note 6.
160. See Cunningham & Foley, supra note 6.
161. On the other hand, the Housing Authority had been the subject of several
other class actions previously and was a "repeat offender."
162. See Dixon, 967 F. Supp. at 535 (22 years); Shaw v. Allen, 771 F. Supp. 760,
763 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) (ordering receivership after eight years of noncompliance with
the court's remedial decree); Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 498 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (denying for the first time plaintiffs' motion for receivership); Newman v. State
of Ala., 466 F. Supp. 628, 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (six years); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous.
Auth., No. 66-C1459 (N.D. Ill. filed Jan. 13, 1984) (denying for the second time
plaintiffs' motion for receivership). Note that receivership was finally imposed in
Chicago's scattered-site housing in 1987. But see Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724

(S.D. Ga. 1966) (acting immediately to prevent the county from circumventing school
desegregation by imposing receivership).
163. See Cunningham & Foley, supra note 6, at 1034 (cautioning that
"receivership is merely a tool and may prove harmful if it is badly designed or
improperly used"). Cunningham and Foley illustrate this admonition with reference to
the Chester, Pennsylvania temporary receiver imposed by HUD in 1990. HUD placed
the Chester Housing Authority in the hands of a private real estate management company
as an "informal receiver." Cunningham and Foley note that since the real estate company
was not qualified to run a complex public housing authority, and as a result made bad

public policy decisions, the problems of the Chester public housing tenants continued
after the informal receivership began. This slow start can be contrasted with the housing
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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remedy under a weak "substitute teacher" receivership model. On the other
hand, the appointment of the aggressive, business-oriented TAG receiver
illustrates how one or two dynamic, experienced people acting as receiver can
positively impact an organization." Courts have named two different types of
receivers-either a government official or a private individual, often acting
under the auspices of a for-profit company. All current or previous public
housing receivers-D.C., Chicago, Boston, Chester, and Kansas City-are
65
private individuals or businesses with no ties to state or local government.'
This can be contrasted with school and prison receiverships, almost all of which
were reallocations of power within the state or local government. 66 The two
camps continue to coexist with no legal mandate to prefer one form over the
67
other.1
Overall, the verdict is divided on the appropriateness of receivership as a
remedy in institutional reform litigation. Critics often point to "receivership" as

expert, Rob Rosenberg, appointed as the permanent receiver by the court in 1994. See
Massaro v. Chester Hous. Auth., 1999 WL 624485 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 1999).
164. See Cunningham, supra note 6, at 81 (describing the selection of David
Gilmore as the receiver of the D.C. Housing Authority as "one of the most important

elements of the litigation." Gilmore was a housing expert from outside the D.C.
community who had experience running a Housing Authority.).
165. Daniel Levin and Habitat, Co., a real estate brokerage, development, and
management company, act as court-appointed receiver for Chicago's scattered-site
program. Robert Rosenberg, President of the for-profit Rosenberg Housing Group, is the
court-appointed receiver of the Chester Housing Authority. Harry Spence, a private
public housing consultant, served as Boston's receiver. From Harry Spence's Boston
Housing Authority receivership sprang up a cottage-industry of housing receivers.
Jeffrey Lines, President of TAG and serving as receiver in Kansas City, worked under
Spence at the BHA. David Gilmore, the Deputy of Operations in the BHA receivership,

is the court-appointed receiver of the D.C. Housing Authority.
166. See Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1976) (affirming the

appointment of the school district superintendent as receiver of South Boston High
School); Newman, 466 F. Supp. at 635 (naming the Governor the receiver for a state

prison system); Turner, 255 F. Supp. at 730 (naming the state Superintendent of Schools
as the receiver for a county school district); Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne
County Chief Executive Officer, 444 N.W.2d 549, 558-60 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)
(affirming appointment of Wayne County executive as receiver of county jail system,
displacing the sheriffwho failed to comply with consent decree). But see Shaw, 771 F.
Supp. at 764 (appointing an assistant professor at Marshall University with experience
in corrections as the receiver of the county jail).
167. In Perez v. Boston HousingAuthority, the highest court of Massachusetts
approved a private individual as receiver of Boston public housing, but reserved the legal

question of whether a receiver needs to be a state official. Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth.,
400 N.E.2d 1231, 1250 n.30 (distinguishing Morgan, Turner,and Newman, all of which

appointed a state official rather than a private person such as Harry Spence, the receiver
of the Boston Housing Authority).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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a symbol of all the dangers associated with judicial activism. 68 It is rare,
however, for discussion of "receivership" to leave the general dialog about
judicial restraint and the proper role of courts to consider actual cases of the true
dissolution of recalcitrant defendants. One study of the receivership remedy in
action at South Boston High School mildly criticizes the remedy and speculates
that Judge Garrity's sweeping use of judicial power would never withstand
Supreme Court review. 69 Conversely, a public management study of Harry
Spence's activities as the receiver of the Boston Housing Authority provides a
positive image of the opportunities for reform afforded by the court displacing
incompetent defendants. 7 ' The Boston study illustrates one of the most
distinctive features of receivership, also seen in Tinsley-receivership gives the
court an opportunity to bring effective management skills into a troubled, often
paralyzed organization.'

B. Implications andEffects of Receivership in Kansas City
1. The Guinotte Controversy
The controversy surrounding the redevelopment of Kansas City's Guinotte
Manor provides a tangible example with which to ground the discussion of the
legitimacy and efficacy of the receivership remedy in practice. Under Kansas
City municipal zoning laws, all Housing Authority developments must be
approved by the City Council,' and elected members of the City Council are
accountable to their constituents for these decisions. TAG assisted the Housing

168. See, e.g., Donald Horowitz, Decreeing OrganizationalChange: Judicial
Supervision ofPublic Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1302 (cautioning against letting
"frustration with organizational change litigation prople [sic] too much enthusiasm for
procedural innovations" such as receivers). Horowitz worries that the growing use of
receivers threatens the judicial process because of the informal ex parte nature of their
conversations with the judge. Id. at 1300, 1302. For further critique of the receivership
remedy, see Diver, supra note 2, at 100 (expressing concern that the receivership remedy
creates martyrs within the recalcitrant organization).
169. See Roberts, supranote 6, at 109-10 (rejecting a per se bar on receivership for
public institutions, but suggesting a case-by-case "rule of reason" analysis of the
particular circumstances of the noncompliance).

170. See MOORE, supranote 6; see also Cunningham, supra note 6 (heralding the
success of receivership in D.C. Public Housing); Cunningham & Foley, supra note 6
(praising the effectiveness of the receivership remedy for public agencies, particularly
public housing authorities, and presenting a practical guide for public interest advocates
on how to secure a receivership remedy on behalf of poor people). See generallyNote,
Receivership as a Remedy in Civil Rights Cases, supra note 142, at 141 (providing
general praise for the expansion of receivership into public institutional reform cases).
171. See MOORE, supra note 6; see also Cunningham, supra note 6.
172. See, e.g., KAN. CrrY, Mo., MUNIC. CODE §§ 66-43 & 80-270 (1998).
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Authority procure a large $47.5 million HOPE VI grant' 73 to renovate the city's
oldest and largest housing development, the 412 unit Guinotte Manor. 74 The
Housing Authority plan called for a three hundred unit development to be rebuilt
on the current site of Guinotte Manor, with the remaining one hundred plus units
being built in scattered-site developments throughout the city. 75 Though many
cities used HOPE VI grant money to fund Section 8 vouchers for private
housing, 76 TAG, supported by plaintiffs' counsel, chose not to pursue that
policy for public housing. Residents of Columbus Park mounted strong
opposition to this redevelopment
plan and the City Council delayed approval of
77
the zoning permits.1

At Guinotte, the stage was set for what normally would be a political
struggle. The plaintiffs' counsel and the receiver pushed for redevelopment of
current public housing, fearing a loss in total public housing units if replacement
housing was pursued through a private voucher system. 171 Columbus Park
residents advocated a classic not-in-my-backyard ("NIMBY") position, worrying
about the decline of area property values. However, it was not only a selfish

173. HOPE VI is an acronym for "Homeownership and Opportunity for People
Everywhere." It is a program created by Congress in 1992 to revitalize severely
distressed public housing developments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437aaa (1992) (repealed
1998). "Local public housing authorities may use HOPE VI grant monies for a variety
of purposes, including... planning revitalization projects, demolition, renovation,
providing Section 8 rent vouchers, social services, and . . . building replacement
dwellings." Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 178 F.3d 951, 954 (7th Cir. 1999).
174. See Bill Norton, HUD Aid Will FinanceRebirth of Guinotte,KAN. CITY STAR,
Aug. 27, 1993, at Cl.
175. A 300 unit public housing development is substantial in size even considering
the reduction in units from the prior development.
176. Section 8 vouchers enable a potential public housing tenant to take a
government voucher to a cooperating private landlord. The government then pays or
subsidizes the private market rent for that tenant. These vouchers are often used as a
means to disperse public housing residents in non-public housing neighborhoods.
177. See Jim Davis, Renovation Dispute Still Ablaze Over Guinotte, KAN. CITY
Bus. J., Dec. 6, 1996. Columbus Park is one of the most diverse neighborhoods in
Kansas City. It has a large, multi-ethnic population with a significant number of
Vietnamese-Americans. The community is 39% white with a historical Italian-American
tilt. The Columbus Park community borders the River Market area, which experienced
remarkable redevelopment and gentrification in the late 1990s. Many residents of
Columbus Park felt the success of River Market could be theirs without the stigma and
crime associated with the public housing complex in the community. Id.
178. The drawback to the Section 8 program is often private landlords are not
interested in taking Section 8 tenants because of bias and/or the administrative burden
associated with the vouchers. Also, there is no guarantee that the landlord will allow
Section 8 tenants to continue living in the apartment, so they are an uncertain means of
replacement housing for demolished developments. The replacement housing concern
was the primary reason behind the decision not to pursue a strategy of Section 8 housing.
Interview with Julie Levin, supra note 22.
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28

2000]

Luedtke: Luedteke: Innovation or Illegitimacy:
RECEIVERSHIP INPUBLICHOUSING LITIGATION

683

NIMBY position on the other side of the receiver's Guinotte plan. A national
trend in public housing emphasized the benefits of "moving to opportunity"
programs, seeking to disperse public housing through scattered-site
developments, mixed income projects, and an increase in private vouchers. 79
Upon a complaint from the Housing Authority receiver, Judge Whipple
reprimanded the City for their delay in approving the receiver's redevelopment
plan for Guinotte and even stated that the City Council's inaction might violate
the Fair Housing Act.'" Judge Whipple ordered the City Council to file a
written explanation to show cause for the delay. 18' Mike Burke, attorney for the
Columbus Park residents, expressed concem that this dispute should be "settled
on a negotiated basis, not a litigated basis."'8 2 Judge Whipple held hearings to
determine whether to override the City Council and impose the receiver's
redevelopment plan.'83 The court ultimately agreed to wait while the City
Council came up with a compromise plan that would please the court and the
receiver." One month later, in March 1997, the City Council unanimously
approved a compromise plan, which reduced the number of public housing units
on site at Guinotte from 300 to 219, and provided for some full market rate
apartments.'$' The remainder of the replacement housing would be built as
scattered-site units. 8 6 The City agreed to contribute nine million dollars to
subsidize additional costs associated with the compromise plan. The court and
the receiver agreed to the City's plan, and the reconstruction recently finished
with the praise of the Columbus Park community and city officials. 88

179. See, e.g., Schill, supra note 11, at 502 (arguing that public housing authorities
should be allowed to knock down dilapidated projects and rebuild scattered-site
developments or encourage private Section 8 vouchers).
180. See Chris Lester, Delay in ProjectExamined, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 9, 1997,
at C2.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Chris Lester, CouncilBalks on Guinotte: Stage is Setfor CourtHearings,
KAN. CrrY STAR, Jan. 31, 1997, at Cl.
184. See Chris Lester, Judge Gives Kansas City Time to Develop GuinotteManor
Alternatives, KAN. CITY STAR, Feb. 4, 1997, at B1.
185. Metro Digest, KAN. CITY STAR, July 6, 1997, at B2.
186. Id.
187. Interview with Jeffrey Lines, supra note 102.
188. See Horsley, supra note 127; see also Igoe, Singing Praises,supra note 127,
at B3 (announcing the current support of public housing residents and the President of
the Community Council for the newly rebuilt Guinotte). Lines attributes this community
support for the project in large part to the community's participation in the compromise
plan and ownership in its success. A community evaluation committee was put in place
by TAG/Housing Authority to get input from the community, and as a result of the
committee, the Housing Authority worked with the city to offer expanded social services
for the entire Columbus Park community. Interview with Jeffrey Lines, supranote 102.
In February 1999, a national public housing advocacy newsletter applauded the reforms
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2. The Expanding Scope of Receivership Intervention
While the Kansas City community and Columbus Park residents applauded
the final compromise redevelopment plan resulting from the Guinotte
controversy, the process raised serious questions about the scope of the court's
equitable role in reforming a public institution. While it is the receiver's
traditional duty to protect the assets of the offending organization,1 9 and
Guinotte Manor was certainly a significant asset of the Housing Authority, the
dispute seemed to be one of conflict between two common philosophies of how
to utilize public housing assets. Improving the Housing Authority's asset mix,
by replacing dilapidated, dangerous buildings with scattered-site units and
private vouchers, would reflect a predominant national trend in public housing,
as well as a statutory option under the HOPE VI program. 190 Furthermore, the
City Council was within its rights as the legislative branch of the city
government to choose to follow the legitimate philosophy of "moving to
opportunity" advocates without court intervention.
The court's interference in the Guinotte redevelopment was a remedy far
removed from the court's original mandate to protect the rights of the Tinsley
class, all residents of T.B. Watkins and persons on the waiting list, and the Boles
class, all residents of Riverview. Neither the Tinsley nor Boles complaints or
consent decrees even mention Guinotte Manor or its residents, and the court was
not presented with facts concerning the violation of any statutory or
constitutional rights of Guinotte residents. Hence, the court's interference raises
serious concerns given the Supreme Court's dictates regarding the tight fit
between right and remedy- "A federal remedial power may be exercised 'only
on the basis of a constitutional violation' and '[a]s with any equity case, the
nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy."" '9 For example, in
order to expand a segregation remedy outside one school district, there must be
a showing that there was a violation of rights outside that school district."2

Similarly, it seems, that for a court to have remedial powers over Guinotte
Manor, the court should have found upon entering the Consent Decree that the

at Guinotte Manor that resulted from the HOPE VI grant, particularly focusing on the
positive use of resident input. See Scott, supranote 123.
189. The plaintiffs' counsel Julie Levin explained the expansion of TAG and the
court's involvement into Guinotte as necessary to protect the assets of the Housing
Authority, which is a traditional duty of the receiver. Interview with Julie Levin, supra
note 22. This is consistent with the use of receivership in commercial and bankruptcy
litigation.
190. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
191. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737 (quoting Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
192. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745. "[W]ithout an interdistrict violation and

interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy."
Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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rights of the residents of all Kansas City public housing developments were
intertwined with the rights of T.B. Watkins and Riverview residents such that the
de facto demolition of one complex resulted in statutory violations in another
complex. Alternatively, the court should have found that the de facto demolition
of unnamed housing developments such as Guinotte implicated the rights of the
Tinsley plaintiffs on the public housing waiting list. The court, however, did not
make either of these findings which might have justified the extraordinary scope
of its remedial intervention.
This problem of scope illustrates a potential difference between receivership
and other institutional reform litigation. When a receiver displaces a defendant

organization, an expansion of the scope of reform could be justified under the
banner of "protection of institutional assets." Guinotte illustrates this practice
in action. Pre-receivership, the courts could not have intervened in the Guinotte
controversy absent the filing of a new complaint.
3. The Never-Ending Duration of the Receivership Remedy
The most troubling aspect of the receivership remedy, particularly as
applied in Tinsley, is the court's failure to provide an explicit exit plan for the
receivership while there was still jurisdiction over a "case or controversy." The
receivership order was very vague, merely stating that the receiver "will serve
at the pleasure of this Court."193 Now, seven years later, t ere is still uncertainty
surrounding when and how the receivership remedy will end, despite the recent
accolades from HUD, public housing residents, and the greater Kansas City
community. TAG's most recent Annual Report to the court, approved
November 1999, established a post-receivership governance task force charged
with defining an exit plan and structuring the Housing Authority upon the
conclusion of receivership. 94 The task force includes participation from the
Mayor's office."95 The goal is for the task force to meet monthly and ultimately
submit governance recommendations to the court by the end of 2000.196 The
issues currently under consideration by the task force include the proper size and
composition of the new Board of Commissioners, how to retain the
organizational effectiveness and qualified professionals working in the Housing
Authority under the receiver, and how to transition from redeveloping a troubled
agency to effective asset management.' 97 Assuming the court accepts the task
force's recommendations in early 2001, the new Board would likely report to the

193. Receivership Order 1, Tinsley (No. 89-00230CV-W-1). The Order "may be
modified as necessary to assure the success of the receivership, and eventually, to return
the operation of the [Housing Authority] to the [Housing Authority] Board." Id. 7.
194. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Lines, President of TAG Associates and the
Receiver of Kansas City Housing Authority (Apr. 17, 2000).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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receiver during a transitional period.'98 The receiver reasserts that the objective
is for TAG to "go away"; in fact, the receiver explains that his financial
incentive to remain as receiver is eliminated once all Housing Authority
developments are rebuilt and modernized, which should occur by the end of
2000.1"9 An ad hoc exit strategy is beginning to develop seven years after the
receivership order took power over public housing away from Kansas City
officials.
This uncertainty over an exit strategy is not uncommon among receivership
remedies, which often leave the terms and conditions for ending receivership
open and ambiguous."
This indefiniteness is a problem because under
receivership, "the defendant" is a legal fiction-the receiver controls all
decision-making within the defendant organization. Where there is no longer a

198. Id. During this transitional period, legislative changes to Mo. REV. STAT. §§
99.010-.230 (1994) will be necessary.
199. Id.
200. In Velez v. Cisneros,the public housing authority receivership began in 1994
and is still ongoing. The receivership order provides "[t]he Receiver's appointment shall
be terminated when the court determines, either sua sponte or upon petition by the
Receiver or any party, that CHA has cured all breaches ....

The court may also

terminate the Receivership upon the court's conclusion that to do so would be in the best
interests of CHA." Receivership Order, Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (No. 90-6449). The order further provided for an annual hearing to "consider
progress in achieving the overall purposes of this Order, and whether this Order and the
Receivership should be terminated." Id. In Boston, the receivership order provided for
renewal of the public housing receivership at an annual public hearing. See Perez v.
Boston Hous. Auth., 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1251-52 (Mass. 1980). The receivership exit
strategy in D.C.'s mental health receivership order was vague, providing that "this Order
shall remain in effect until such time as the SDP and the orders of this Court have been
fully implemented, and the receivership is no longer necessary to assure the ongoing
operation of the District of Columbia's mental health system in accordance with all legal
requirements." Dixon v. Barry, 967 F. Supp. 555,556 (D.D.C. 1997). See also Newman
-v. State of Ala., 466 F. Supp. 628, 637 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (receivership ordered "until
such time as the receivership is no longer needed to assure compliance with minimal
constitutional standards"); Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Chief Executive
Officer, 444 N.W.2d 549, 561 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (receiver must report quarterly to

the court so "the court will retain the flexibility immediately to order an end to the
receivership when the need for it expires"). A couple receiverships did provide more
explicit exit plans. See Vernon Loeb, D.C. Cedes Control of HousingAgency, WASH.
POST, May 5, 1995, at Al (D.C. Housing Authority receivership would end if they
received a score of 70 from HUD's annual review two out of three years; the receivership
had a built-in sunset of 2000). The receivership order for the McDowell County Jail
ordered a one-year receivership, but provided the parties an opportunity to petition the
court to end receivership ifthe receiver succeeded in his goals, or alternatively, to extend
receivership if "the McDowell County Jail remains in noncompliance and/or is of yet
unable to remain in compliance without [the receiver's] supervision." Shaw v. Allen,
771 F. Supp. 760, 765 (S.D. W. Va. 1990).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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defendant, it is unclear who would petition the court to end receivership. In
Kansas City, the City Council and Mayor have not intervened to call for an end
to the remedial intervention and appear to suffer from democratic debilitation.2"'
The plaintiff residents are happy with the receiver and unlikely to ask the court
for an end to receivership. The for-profit receiver has a financial disincentive to
move to end receivership so long as the Housing Authority is receiving HUD
grants to build and redevelop new housing units. Hence, it appears the remedy
will continue until Judge Whipple decides sua sponte to end receivership or until
the financial incentive for TAG Associates dwindles with the transition of the
Housing Authority from an agency under construction to an asset management
agency. The problem of ending the receivership remedy is not unique to Kansas
City public housing; in fact, no receivership imposed in the last decade has yet
to end. 2 This uncertainty could be the result of a lack of any ongoing case or

201. For a discussion of democratic debilitation, see infra Part Il(B)(6). In
contrast, newly elected D.C. Mayor Anthony Williams has taken an interest in regaining
control of the five D.C. agencies under court-ordered receivership. In February 2000, he
appointed Grace Lopes as Special Counsel for Institutional Reform Litigation to work
with the courts and the receivers of the five agencies in hopes of devolving control back
to the city. Grace Lopes describes that one of her jobs is to work with the courts and
receivers "developing and implementing legal strategies for successfully resolving...
receiverships, and transitioning back to the control of the D.C. government." She is also
prepared to intervene in the litigation if necessary. See DC Child and Family Services
Receivership: Testimony of GraceM.Lopes Before the Subcomm. on D.C. Comm. on
Gov't Reform and Oversight ofthe House ofRepresentatives,2000 WL 19303374 (May
5, 2000).
202. Two receiverships imposed in the 1990s will come to an end at the end of
2000 or early 2001. On March 6,2000, Judge Thomas Hogan approved an agreement
between advocates for the mentally ill and the D.C. government designed to end the
failed D.C. mental health receivership and return control to the city. See Bill Miller, Plan
Approved to Restore D.C. 's Control ofMentalHealth, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2000, at B4.
The agreement is part of D.C. Mayor Williams' plan to regain control of the five D.C.
agencies under receivership. Id. Under the agreement approved by Judge Hogan, a new
interim receiver will create a plan to transfer control of the mental health system to the
city in the first half of 2001 and the receiver will then remain as a monitor during a
transition period, with the power to ask the court to reinstate the receivership if the city
fails in its initial management of the agency. Id. In addition, the D.C. public housing
receiver is currently planning for the transfer of power back to the city by the end of
2000, the designated sunset for the receivership delineated in the original receivership
order. See Carol Leonnig, Housing Chiefin D.C. Seeks Autonomy for Agency, WASH.
POST, May 12, 2000, at B7. Uncertainty surrounds the exit strategy for other
receiverships, including the three remaining D.C. agencies. The Chicago Housing
Authority's scattered-site receivership continues thirteen years after it began. See
Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 178 F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 1999). In the Chester public
housing receivership, they have begun talks about how to end receivership, and the
receiver's Interim Status Report submitted for 1999 outlines at least two more years of
work for the receiver to accomplish. See Interim Status Report from Robert Rosenberg,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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controversy, a constitutional requirement under Article HI.203 Where litigation
is "not in any real sense adversary," we will not have "a safeguard essential to
the integrity of the judicial process, and one which we have held to be
indispensable to adjudication of constitutional questions by this Court."2'
Given the lack of adversity under receivership, the original receivership
order should present a clear and defined exit strategy for how, when, and on
what conditions the receivership is to end. This order should be drafted while
a live controversy still exists between an aggrieved plaintiff and a noncomplying
defendant. On the other hand, too much specificity on the exit plan could render
the remedy less effective. Plaintiffs' counsel in Tinsley explains that the
receivership order was intentionally short and brief in order to provide greater
flexibility for unforeseeable issues that might arise during the receivership. 2 5 A
balance of a defined exit strategy imposed while there is adversity between two
parties and the requisite flexibility to make the order workable is the answer.
The D.C. Housing Authority presents an excellent example of how litigants can
negotiate and suggest objective criteria for the receivership order that can trigger
an eventual end to the receivership coupled with a reasonably distant but defined
sunset that automatically ends the remedial intervention. In the D.C. order, the
Receiver, Chester Housing Authority, to United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania (Dec. 1999) (on file with author). For examples of earlier
receiverships ending, see Newmann v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1517 (1lth Cir. 1984)
(noting the Alabama prison receivership ended in 1983 when the receiver, Governor Fob
James, was replaced by Governor George Wallace, who did not petition to intervene in
the litigation and become the receiver); Morgan v. McDonough, 456 F. Supp. 1113,
1115 (granting Boston School District's motion to end the two year long South Boston
High School receivership); Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724, 733-34 (S.D. Ga. 1965)
(granting receiver's motion to terminate receivership in Taliaferro County School District
after one school year). Boston's public housing was in receivership for five years and
turned over to the mayor in 1984 after an annual review hearing. See Patrick Reardon
& Stanley Ziemba, HUD and Mayor Vow Assistance, CHI. TRM., Apr. 29, 1987, at 1.
203. Generally, "Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to
adjudicating actual 'cases' and 'controversies."' Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750
(1984). Further probing on the "case" or "controversy" requirement applied here raises
an interesting question, beyond the scope of this Article, about the private rights and
public rights models of adjudication. The private rights model of adjudication contends
that the federal courts should limit themselves to the more traditional case-by-case
method of adjudication, where an actual "case" or "controversy" involving specific
litigants and particular facts is resolved. The public rights model offers a broader view
of the role of federal courts. It includes institutional reform litigation where courts
exercise broad remedial powers to reform public housing, jails, and schools. For a
discussion of these models, see RICHARD FALLON ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTs AND THE

FEDERAL SYSTEM 78-82 (4th ed. 1988). See also Susan Brandeis, The Idea of a Case,
42 STAN. L. REv. 227 (1990); Chayes, supranote 4; Fiss, supra note 3; Lon L. Fuller,
The Forms andLimits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
204. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943).
205. Telephone Interview with Julie Levin, supra note 43.
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court provided that the receivership would end automatically when the authority
achieved a HUD performance rating of seventy for two out of three years. The
order also contained a fixed sunset; if the authority failed to achieve the desired
ratings after six years, the receivership would end.2 7
It is time for the receivership in Kansas City to end.2"' The causes of action
found in Tinsley andBoles no longer exist; thus, there is no longer a violation of
rights justifying remedial intervention in the municipal government's discretion
over public housing."" Last year, plaintiffs' counsel in the Tinsley litigation,
Julie Levin, proclaimed, "'The receivership was the last resort, and it's
worked.', 210 A HUD study gave the Housing Authority in 1998 an "A" and
dubbed it a "high performer. 211 By the summer of 1999, T.B. Watkins was
completely modernized with all brand-new units.212 A remedy must be closely
tailored to the right violated; nonviolators cannot be punished.213 The First

206. See Loeb, supra note 200, at Al.
207. See Loeb, supranote 200, at Al.
208. If there were a defendant still in place in Tinsley, it could petition for
termination of the court's involvement. See Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., Ind. Sch. Dist.
No. 89 v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (finding school desegregation decrees "are
not intended to operate in perpetuity"). The Dowell Court defined the standard of review
for dissolving a desegregation decree after "the local authorities [had] operated in
compliance with it for a reasonable period of time" and that compliance was judged by
a relatively forgiving "good faith" standard. Id. at 248-49.
209. As discussed above, the Supreme Court limits the equitable power of the
federal courts and instructs that "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).

Moreover, the "remedy is justifiable only insofar as it advances the ultimate objective of
alleviating the initial constitutional violation." Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489
(1992).
210. Rice, supra note 125, at B1.
211. See Igoe, KC. Housing Agency Makes HonorRoll, supra note 137, at B9.
More accolades came at the end of 1999 when a housing watchdog group, Housing
Comes First, honored agency officials for their "steady improvement to a highperforming agency during recent years." A Housing Comes First representative
described the reform as "phenomenal." See Shawna Hamel, HousingPraise,KAN. CrrY
STAR, Dec. 22, 1999, at BI.
212. See Igoe, The CaseForChange, supra note 23.
213. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that you cannot impose the
costs of injunctive relief on nonviolators). In the school desegregation context, courts
have held that a finding of past discrimination was not enough to sanction a remedy of
indeterminable length which may extend after the initial violation of rights was
dissipated. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) (noting that "once the
racial imbalance due to the de jure violation ha[d] been remedied, the school district
[wa]s under no duty to remedy imbalance that [wa]s caused by demographic factors");
Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 801-02 (1st Cir. 1998) (invalidating Boston Latin
High School's affirmative action policy which aimed to remedy intentional
discrimination in the past, but was unable to find a current violation of a Constitutional
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Circuit's test for ending the South Boston High School receivership was that the
receivership "should last no longer than the conditions which justify it make
necessary."214 When conditions improved and the attitude of South Boston High
School officials changed to support desegregation, the judge granted the
district's motion to terminate the receivership.21 Applying the Morgan test to
Tinsley, it is unlikely one could assert a de facto demolition argument or a Title
VIII disparate impact claim as applied to the sparkling new T.B. Watkins homes.
Whether the reforms of the receiver have been institutionalized is central
to the success of ending receivership. The TAG receivers have applied their
expertise and efficient business management for six years with great accolades,
but it is unclear how much of Jeffrey Lines, Eugene Jones, and Dallas Parks'
reforms have been assimilated by the two hundred plus permanent Housing
Authority staff. The challenge of retaining the capable civil servants currently
serving under the receiver is an issue facing the new governance task force.2 16
The Kansas City press has begun to worry that the success at the Housing
Authority was the exclusive result of TAG, and that the new management
processes may not have been sufficiently institutionalized to survive postreceivership.217 The other two public housing authorities under receivership,
D.C. and Chester, are both struggling with the same question of how to end
receivership in such a way that the important reforms are preserved under
government management. 218

right to justify the remedy in the present).
214. Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
215. Two years after ordering receivership, Judge Garrity terminated the
receivership of South Boston High School upon observation that the physical conditions
of the building improved, the School Committee's demonstrated commitment to
desegregation through programs such as the affirmative action plan for the city's
examination schools, and the Department of Implementation's demonstrated good faith
intentions to monitor compliance with the desegregation decree. See Morgan v.
McDonough, 456 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (D. Mass. 1978) (acting on motion of defendant
school district to end receivership). It is important to observe that the Boston schools
case is different from Tinsley, however, because Judge Garrity only displaced one
school's officials. The School District defendants still had power and were in a position
to move to end receivership once conditions improved.
216. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Lines, supra note 194.
217. See E. Thomas McClanahan, Editorial, The Murky Future of Kansas City's
PublicHousing Authority, KAN. CrrY STAR, Apr. 5, 1998, at Li.
218. D.C. expects to end its six year receivership in the fall of 2000. There are
currently talks underway over how that transition will work. See David Gilmore, Close
to Home, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1999, at B8 (suggesting measures to maintain the
receivership's success after judicial supervision ends); see also Leonnig, supra note 202,
at B7. It was decided in D.C. that the new Board of Commissioners would be comprised
of three elected tenant Board members and six members appointed by the Mayor. The
elections for the tenant representatives occurred in March 2000. See D.C. Housing
Residents Pick Board, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2000, at B4. Chester is also planning for
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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This ambiguity over how to institutionalize receivership may highlight a
differentiating aspect of the receivership remedy as opposed to consent decrees

and structural injunctions. With consent decrees, there is concern that the policy
directives mandated by the decree will not continue once the decree is lifted. For
example, as courts are vacating school desegregation plans with findings of
unitary status, education advocates worry that the schools will drift back to
segregationist ways. There is anxiety that desegregation efforts have not been
sufficiently institutionalized in society to remain after the judicial compulsion is
removed. With receivership, particularly in the context of public housing
authorities taken over because of dysfunction and organizational paralysis, the
problem is more institutionalization of administrative processes and management
capabilities rather than policy priorities and social norms. All institutional
reform litigation faces the challenge of institutionalizing the desired goal for the
institution so that it is sustainable without court enforcement. Receivership has
the added burden of teaching the staff and agency leaders how to run the agency,
how to keep billing records, how to make a budget, and other basic public
management skills. This difficult task of institutionalization would benefit from
a clear exit plan, both as to when, and how, receivership will end.
4. Removal From Influence by the Majority
A significant implication of the Tinsley receivership has been the removal
of all public housing decisions in Kansas City from any check by the democratic
process. This countermajoritarian concern is a common response to institutional
reform litigation and, more generally, to judicial activism. 2 9 In Kansas City,
under receivership, there is no democratic official accountable to the majority for
public housing. Prior to the imposition of receivership in 1993, Mayor Cleaver
appointed the Board of Commissioners and conceivably a voter could have
expressed her distaste for the deterioration of public housing or the

redevelopment of complexes like Guinotte through the politically accountable
Mayor. Alternatively, a voter could have voiced her concern to her City
Councilperson. However, under receivership, TAG Associates is not directly
accountable to the voters of Kansas City. Furthermore, TAG does not report to
city, state, or federal elected officials who might serve as conduits of the popular

the ultimate transition out of receivership. The Receiver's 1999 Interim Status Report
recognizes 'this Receivership is a finite measure," so the report has "begun to formulate
an endgame for the recovery strategy" which includes among other things a two year
time frame for training the staff to operate under a site-based asset management structure,
two years to finish construction, and an ongoing effort to recruit and train a "competent
and informed Advisory Board" from the ranks of which the "new Board of
Commissioners would likely be created... at the conclusion of the Receivership." See
Interim Status Report from Robert Rosenberg, supra note 202.
219. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
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will. Though TAG has been conscientious about consulting with the citizenry
and elected officials through regular "receivership meetings," nothing in the
receivership remedy compelled such consultation.

However, any majoritarian criticism of receivership must contend with the
reality that "politics" can be a toxic influence on public institutions, justifying
drastic judicial intervention in order to protect individual rights from the will of
the majority. Judge Whipple considered "politics" a dangerous institutional
influence in Kansas City, particularly on the Housing Authority." Upon issuing
the receivership order, Judge Whipple instructed the new receiver to "put a tape
recorder on his phone 'so you can record conversations by these so-called dogooding politicians, claiming to help tenants when in fact they're helping
themselves."'''
In the context of public housing boards, the day-to-day
managers and decisionmakers ousted by receivership are not elected officials;
rather, they are municipal bureaucrats, appointed by the mayor with no direct
accountability to the voters. The democratic critique of Judge Whipple's
receivership order loses power in this bureaucratic context.2" Professor
Matthew Adler points out that the administrative state is growing and
bureaucracies such as the Board of Commissioners are no more democratic than
a federal judge.'

220. Tom Jackman & Jeffrey Spivak, HousingAuthority Put In Receivership, KAN.
CrrY STAi, July 7, 1993, at Al. Conversely, ousted Housing Authority Director Luther
Washington defended politicians in the press, commenting that "'[w]e're in a democracy
that is based upon politics and arriving at some kind of consensus. If politics is bad, so
is the entire government that we live under."' Id.
221. Id.
222. Robert Rosenberg, the court-appointed receiver of the Chester Housing
Authority, attributes receivership's success in Chester in large part to depoliticizing
public housing administration, an area where positions were previously filled through
political patronage. Telephone Interview with Robert Rosenberg, Receiver of Chester
Housing Authority (Jan. 20, 2000). A case study of the Boston Housing Authority and
the Perezlitigation employs "politically" as a word with negative connotation, noting
that the receiver "could do no worse than the old, politically controlled board." CHARLES
M. HAAR & LANCE LiBMmm, PROPERTY AND LAw 461 (Little, Brown, and Co., 2d ed.

1985). A case study of the D.C. Housing Authority reforms noted the Mayor's
appointments "perpetuated the old practice of sending incompetent political appointees
to run it." Cunningham & Foley, supra note 6, at 1034. Assessing the success of the
D.C. housing receivership, The Wall Street Journal noted "Mr. Gilmore has a big
advantage over most housing directors: He doesn't have to dicker with City Hall." John
J. Fialka, Washington'sHousingDirectorMakes the Leap From Talking aboutReform
to Really DoingIt, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1996, at A24. Outgoing receiver Gilmore's
recommendation for the post-receivership D.C. Housing Authority was that appointments
to the governing board "should be made on the basis of merit, not political allegiance,
and should be beholden to no particular faction or officialdom

... ."

Gilmore, supranote

218, at B8.
223. See Matthew D. Adler, JudicialRestraintin the Administrative State: Beyond
the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759 (1997) (arguing that the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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Moreover, it is the court's role in a democratic system of government to
protect individual ights from the will of the majority. Elected representatives'
discretion to carry out the will of the majority is limited by the Constitution.
Advocates of judicial activism often call upon the famous CaroleneProducts
footnote, reasoning that "discrete and insular minorities" in a democratic system
do not have the power to protect themselves in the voting booth so the courts
must intervene. 4 The rationale is even more cogent when applied to the context
of public housing where residents are an "anonymous and diffuse" group.'
Public housing in Kansas City was stigmatized because of years of neglect,
decay, and corrupt management; as a result, Kansas City residents generally did
not support public housing. 6 Moreover, residents of public housing are
economically powerless, rarely vote, and are a numerical minority of the
municipal population-a group particularly vulnerable to the will of the
majority. Professor Owen Fiss, who generally criticizes the CaroleneProducts
footnote logic, concedes that the argument works best in public housing
authorities and welfare departments that "might be seen as posing threats to
distinct subgroups that are politically powerless."' 7 Elected officials have little
political incentive to support public housing because of the relatively small
number of voters who place priority on public housing reform. Under this
rationale, Judge Whipple's role in protecting a vulnerable class of citizens whose
rights were being violated is not anti-democratic, but rather a necessary and
important check in a majoritarian system.
In comparison, consent decrees and structural injunctions are similar to
receivership in their limitation on the discretion of future elected officials.
Michael McConnell's notable critique of consent decrees criticized that the will
of the majority in one year, manifested in a voluntarily negotiated consent
decree, could shackle the popular will a decade later through the judicially
entered mandates of a consent decree.' Voters a decade after Tinsley's Consent

democratic justification for judicial restraint is lost when applied to an administrative
agency with democratically unaccountable bureaucrats).
224. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
225. Bruce Ackerman criticizes Carolene Products "discrete and insular"
terminology because it fails to consider the fact that "prejudice against 'impoverished and
uneducated minorities' may call for a more searching judicial inquiry." Bruce A.
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 723-24 (1985). He
professes that "discrete and insular" minorities are often politically advantaged interest
groups with influential voices in the political process. Id. He argues that the Carolene
Productsrationale should be used to protect "groups that are 'anonymous and diffuse'
rather than 'discrete and insular."' Id.
226. Interview with Jeffrey Lines, supra note 102; Interview with Julie Levin,
supra note 22.
227. Fiss, supranote 3, at 8.
228. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees
to Insulate Policiesfrom PoliticalChange, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 297 (1987) (arguing
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Decree cannot express a policy preference different from the content of that
Decree. The will of the majority is limited. Receivership, through displacement
of appointed and elected officials, similarly eliminates government discretion,
but remains different because of the all-encompassing scope and ambiguous
duration of receivership remedies in practice, often taking an infinite array of a
government organization's decisions out of the democratic realm.
5. Blurred Accountability: Who Is In Charge Here?
Receivership can distort who people identify as government decisionmakers. Who does a resident of Columbus Park, angry about the compromise
plan for Guinotte, hold accountable? Her local city councilwoman for approving
the compromise plan? The mayor for not intervening in the litigation?" 9 Judge
Whipple's mandate to the City Council to show cause and later to develop an
alternative plan for Guinotte perverts the normal lines of accountability in the
eyes of the average Kansas City resident unaware of courtroom battles. Justice
Kennedy, in striking down the Kansas City desegregation court's judicial tax,
observed that "a legislative vote taken under judicial compulsion blurs lines of
accountability by making it appear that the decision was reached by elected
representatives when the reality is otherwise."' 0

that consent decrees are anti-majoritarian and "violate the democratic structure of
government").
229. The mayor is technically the "boss" of the Housing Authority as the chief

executive of the municipality. As such, the mayor likely would have standing to
intervene as of right under Rule 24(a) because he had an "interest relating to the property

or transaction which is the subject of the action" and was "so situated that the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede" his interest. Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(a). Yet, Mayor Cleaver made no effort to intervene in the Tinsley and Boles litigation
or in the Guinotte zoning controversy. For a mayoral challenge in practice, see the
litigation surrounding the District of Columbia public housing receivership. D.C. Mayor
Sharon Pratt Kelly filed for reconsideration of the trial court's imposition of receivership.
Upon losing that challenge, she filed an appeal in the District of Columbia Circuit.
Mayor Pratt Kelly was ultimately unsuccessful in her challenge, but it illustrates how a
mayor could and did fight the receivership remedy. See District of Columbia Fights
Receivership Order, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1994, at C5.
230. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 68 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See
also Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (holding a judge could not fine
individual city councilmen for their refusal to vote to support scattered-site housing
development). This logic is also seen in the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence protecting
state autonomy by limiting the federal government's ability to "commandeer" the states
as enforcement or implementation vehicles of the federal government. See New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (focusing on the legislative branch of the federal
government which unconstitutionally tried to require states to dispose of their own
nuclear waste). See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down as

unconstitutional a federal executive branch mandate that required states to perform
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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Problems of blurred lines of governmental authority are seen with the
increased privatization of government functions. In the prison and education
contexts, privatization is sometimes used to improve service and cut costs
through private companies that contract with the state to run traditionally public
enterprises. 3 For public housing, the President's Commission on Privatization
recently recommended private management as an alternative to traditional
housing authority management. 2 Private companies operating as quasi-state
actors create confusion as to who is responsible for running a traditional public
function. This problem is compounded when a private company is imposed on
elected officials by a court. If Texas chooses to out-source its prison
management, and the citizenry is outraged, they can express their discontent by
electing a new legislature and governor. This is not an option if the court has
imposed the outsourcing, as is the case with Kansas City public housing. The
citizenry has two options in Kansas City. One is to oust current elected officials
whose only responsibility for the situation lies in not challenging the court's
receivership order. 3 Or, the voters can simply feel frustrated in their inability
to act through democratic outlets.

background checks to purchase a gun). A central concern of the "commandeering" case
law is the blurring of lines of accountability.
231. In the prison context, a few states have contracted with private companies to
confine a portion of the state's prisoners. See generallyWarren Ratliff, The DueProcess
Failureof.America's PrisonPrivatizationStatutes, 21 SE0N HALL LEGIS. J. 371 (1997)
(noting that in 1997, the private correctional system holds as many as 74,000 prisoners
with an annual growth rate of 30%). While the 74,000 privately held prisoners are a
small proportion of the 1.8 million prisoners in the United States, it is a trend which
introduces many of the accountability problems seen in the receivership context.
Advocates of educational reform are increasingly pointing to privatization and quasipublic charter schools, particularly in light of the success of for-profit groups such as the
Edison Project and Sabis International, as a solution for a perceived education system
failure. See generallyNorman Atkins, CharterSchools Are PublicSchools, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., June 14, 1998, at 48-49 (describing the popularity of the charter school model);
Nancy J. Zollers & Arun K. Ramanthan, ForProfit CharterSchools and Students with
Disabilities,PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Dec. 1998, at 297-304 (considering how the profitmotive may corrupt the equitable provision of public services, particularly to students
with disabilities who are more expensive to educate because of federal special education
requirements).
232. See Peter Salsich, Solutions to the Affordable Housing Crisis: Perspectives
On Privatization,28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 263, 278-84 (1995) (noting that increasing
numbers of public housing reformers are calling for "load shedding privatization of
troubled public housing units" through private for-profit and non-profit companies
experienced in managing housing developments); see also Vanessa Gallman, Private
ManagersHiredfor Public Housing,PrFTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 8, 1996, at B4
(interviewing the for-profit receiver of the Chester Housing Authority who predicted
"privatization of public housing is definitely the wave of the future").
233. The Mayor of Kansas City arguably has standing to intervene in the Tinsley
litigation to challenge the receivership remedy. See supranote 229.
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But again, the receivership remedy does not appear significantly different
for purposes of political accountability than traditional institutional reform
litigation remedies. It is unrealistic to assume that a citizen of Kansas City can
tell the difference between a receiver running the Housing Authority, when it
operates out of government buildings and with government titles, versus Kansas
City running the Housing Authority under the compulsion of a detailed consent
decree. In both scenarios, the voters may hold the city accountable when it is the
federal judiciary that is pulling the strings behind the scenes. The biggest
difference between the two remedies is how and whether the popular will is
heard. A mayor who is not accountable for public housing is less likely to poll
the public and solicit feedback on the proper direction of the city's public
housing initiatives. A mayor who operates under a consent decree still appoints
commissioners and arguably is in touch with the responsibilities and policy
directives of the Housing Authority. While both can deflect criticism with "the
court made me do it," there is some autonomy value in retaining power over that
government function.
6. Debilitation: The Escape Hatch Problem
A related consideration of accountability is the incentive for public officials
to hide behind receivership as a means of escaping responsibility for reforming
a troubled public institution. Professor Mark Tushnet dubs this problem
"democratic debilitation."' This "pass the buck" philosophy gives officials an
escape hatch from a difficult governmental problem and puts the onus on the
judge, through a court-appointed receiver, to do the job free of the complications
of answering to an electorate. In Kansas City, public housing was a vexing
municipal burden for years. While there was no collusion on the part of the
Tinsley defendants in the imposition of the receivership remedy, one can imagine
a scenario where a city could ask the judge to take over a problematic institution
to get it off the government's hands. Here, perhaps the City Council did not
appeal the court's involvement in the Guinotte controversy because it was easier
to hide behind the court's mandate and tell voters that the unpopular
redevelopment plan was "forced" on them by the judge and the "carpetbagging"
receiver.
Political debilitation can be contagious. Debilitation may be one
explanation behind the clustering of institutional reform receivership remedies.
Of fifteen receivership remedies imposed to reform public institutions, five are
in the District of Columbia and three are in Massachusetts." 5 This indicates a
234. Tushnet explains democratic debilitation in the context of the Canadian
system of judicial review, arguing that active judicial review endangers stable and
vigorous constitutional democracy. See Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and
Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REv. 245 (1995).
235. See supranote 5.
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trend that once a receivership remedy is issued, the novelty has passed and it
becomes acceptable practice. It might even be a remedial step supportedby the
political power structure eager to avoid responsibility for the problem-laden
institution. For example, Judge Arthur Garrity's receivership order for South
Boston High School came after Boston Mayor Kevin White filed a motion with
the court to abandon hope of desegregation and close the school." 6 A few years
later, Judge Paul Garrity ordered receivership for the Boston Housing Authority
and again Mayor White expressed his relief saying, "'That's all right. If they
''' 7
want it, they can have it.
The Boston Mayor's frustration with public
housing and education manifested itself in a desire for, rather than a resistance
to, a receivership remedy. Similarly, the Kansas City press reported a rumor that
Mayor Cleaver supported ajudicially imposed receivership for the Kansas City
schools because he was frustrated with the desegregation quagmire after years
of unsuccessful efforts to achieve quality education for Kansas City students."s
As the debilitation spreads, the implications of receivership extend beyond the

particular successes of the Kansas City public housing authority. Receivership

is a tool that could distort and debilitate traditional channels of responsibility
within the democratic system.
The debilitation danger appears to be one problem that is more acute in the
context of receivership than with structural injunctions or consent decrees. A
receiver displaces the defendant, truly relieving the government of all
responsibility and accountability for the institution, whereas, a consent decree
makes the government go on record as either a recalcitrant protestor, a wary
facilitator, or a committed reformer. Receivership silences public officials,
which confuses voters when it is time to hold some political actor accountable
for institutional reform. In the Kansas City scenario, Mayor Cleaver issued few
statements after 1993 about the drastic public housing reforms implemented by
TAG as receiver of the Housing Authority. Moreover, in the April 1999 mayoral
election, it was unclear where the candidates stood on the new mixed income
and scattered-site development strategy because there was no discussion of
public housing in the campaign. Newly elected Mayor Kay Barnes appears to
be silent on public housing issues. If there had been a consent decree rather than

236. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 65 (noting the mayor's request followed an
unsuccessful plea for Federal Marshals to occupy the school).
237. HAAR &LIEBMAN, supranote 222, at 456. A case study of the D.C. Housing
Authority indicates that Mayor Mario Barry, Jr. agreed to a court-appointed receivership,
but it was evidently after some pressure by HUD. See Cunningham & Foley, supranote
6, at 1034. More case studies are needed to learn about the dynamics of other
receivership cases.
238. See Phillip O'Connor, Cleaver Suggests School Overseer,KAN. CrrY STAR,
Nov. 5, 1998, at C1 (reporting Cleaver's support of education receivership was
announced in the Mayor's October 30th newsletter to supporters); but see Editorial,
Cleaver'sCurious Role With Schools, KAN. CrrY STAR, Nov. 6, 1998, at C6 (pondering
Cleaver's denial that he ever said he favored receivership).
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a receivership, it seems likely that the mayor's stance on important municipal
policy decisions would be on record-whether at contempt of court hearings for
resisting reforms or at ribbon-cutting ceremonies taking credit for the
innovations.
Moreover, the receivership remedy has a tangible effect on the
government's workload. By eliminating an entire segment of the municipal
bureaucracy in Kansas City, the Mayor was able to free his time to focus on
other municipal policy concerns. This creates a practical political incentive to
encourage receivership over other commonly employed institutional reform
remedies. When imposing a receivership on a public institution, courts would
be well advised to consider the potential debilitating effects the remedy might
have on the operations of the government, as well as considering the motives of
the government actors involved.
7. Judicial Role: "The Imperial Whipple"
or "The Accidental Activist"
Judge Dean Whipple is a pivotal, colorful character in the story of reform
at the Kansas City Housing Authority. The receiver attributes the success of the
public housing reforms to the support and leadership of Judge Whipple. 9
Plaintiffs' counsel describes Judge Whipple as playing a positive, instrumental
role in reforming the Housing Authority.' ° Previously a small-town Ozark
prosecutor and state circuit judge before being appointed by President Ronald
Reagan to the federal bench, Judge Whipple has been dubbed in jest "The

Imperial Whipple" because of his power over so many public institutions in
Kansas City.24' Taking a different spin, a front-page profile of Judge Whipple
in 1994 labeled him "The Accidental Activist" because his conservative ideology
seemed incompatible with the high number of public institutions he actively
managed. 2 Aside from the Housing Authority, Judge Whipple presides over

239. Interview with Jeffrey Lines, supra note 102; Telephone Interview with
Eugene Jones, supra note 110. Jeffrey Lines speculates that Judge Whipple was initially
angered by the waste of government resources at the Housing Authority, but he came to
be primarily concerned with protecting the rights of poor people. Similarly, the original
special master in the D.C. housing case attributes "the lion's share of the credit" for

reforming the D.C. Housing Authority "to Judge Steffen Graae, the wise, patient and
caring Superior Court jurist who has presided over the agency's turnaround." James G.
Stockard, Jr., Editorial, The Receiver CleanedHouse, Now Its Up To The City, WASH.
POST., June 27, 1999, at B8.
240. Interview with Julie Levin, supra note 22.
241. See Joe Stephens, JudicialEthicsLaw ContainsFew Loopholes, KAN. CITY.
STAR, Apr. 5, 1998, at A12 (explaining that the power of Mayor Cleaver pales beside that
of Judge Whipple).
242. See Tom Jackrnan, The Accidental Activist: Judge Dean Whipple,
ConservativeBy Reputation,His Rulings In Notable Cases Defy Image, KAN. CrrY STAR,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/2
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the Jackson County jail litigation, holding the County in contempt and imposing
fines for noncompliance with an order intended to alleviate jail overcrowding. 3
Judge Whipple also supervises the Jackson County Division of Family
Services. 2' Moreover, when Judge Russell Clark fell ill, the massive ongoing
Kansas City school desegregation litigation was added to Judge Whipple's
docket where he threatened to impose the receivership remedy in 1998.-'
Judge Whipple is outspoken about his role "supervising part or all of
[various municipal and county] agencies." 24 Judge Whipple explained that .'I
feel I'm being drawn in... I don't want to be an activist judge, I don't feel it's
my place to run any institution. But once I'm drawn in, I'm going to do the best
I can, and rectify what they force me to do."'247 Similarly, after a public hearing
for the first annual receivership report, Judge Whipple publicly elucidated:
First of all, you need to understand, I don't want to run [the Housing
Authority]. I don't think Legal Aid wants to run [the Housing
Authority] .... For heavens sake, I don't want to run it. I am looking
after foster care now. I have got juvenile detention, and I've got jail
overcrowding. My goodness, if I start running HUD, all I [haven't]
got is City Hall and County Government. I don't want to get into that
business.'
Regardless of whether Judge Whipple intentionally pursues a judicially activist
approach or whether this record of institutional reform was an accidental result

May 23, 1994, at Al.
243. See Gromer Jeffers, Jr., Jail CountResults In $5,000 Fine,KAN. CrrY STAR,
Nov. 30, 1994, at Cl (reporting that when jail population reached 625 for one day, Judge
Whipple fined the County $5,000); Joe Lambe, Jackson County Ordered to Ease Jail
Crowding,KAN. Crry STAR, Apr. 27, 1994, at Cl (reported that court held the County
in contempt for noncompliance with order to alleviate overcrowding); Robert P. Sigman,
Editorial, Meeting JailNeeds, KAN. CrrY STAR, June 17, 1994, at C6 (describing the
court order capping the County jail population at 624).
244. See generally Borgersen & Shapiro, supra note 7 (discussing G.L. v. Stangler,
873 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Mo. 1994)).
245. See Editorial, Public Spanking, supra note 7, at B4 (noting Judge Whipple's
exasperation at the school board's lack of cooperation with the Desegregation Monitoring
Committee and reporting that Judge Whipple "raised the possibility of placing the district
in receivership"); see also Barbara Shelly, Hopeful Signs ForKansas City Schools, KAN.
CITY STAR, Nov. 20, 1998, at Bl. See generally Jenkins v. School Dist. of Kan. City,
460 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
246. Jackman, supra note 242, at Al.
247. Jackman, supra note 242, at Al.
248. Special Master's Report on the Status of Housing Authority's Compliance
With Consent Decree, Tinsley (No. 89-0023-CV-W-1). Magistrate Judge Larsen is
quoting Judge Whipple at the December 17, 1992 hearing. Id. at 3.
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of extreme mismanagement in Kansas City institutions, his role as an
instrumental character in the Tinsley case is unquestionable.
The insertion of a judge into the active, policy-making decisions of a
government agency transforms the traditionally dispassionate, detached judicial
role." 9 Judge Whipple is involved in an ongoing, continuous relationship with
the Tinsley parties, the plaintiffs' counsel, and the court-appointed receiver,
placing him in a highly activist managerial position for a federal judge. For
example, he meets with the Public Housing Residents Council, the representative
organization for the Tinsley plaintiffs, at least once a year at the presentation of
the receiver's annual report, and Judge Whipple attends the Residents Council's
Summer Jamboree every summer.Y In addition, Judge Whipple confers with
the TAG receivers every two weeks.s' Through all of this, Judge Whipple must
engage in prospective thinking about the future of the Housing Authority which
transcends the traditional piecemeal, motion-by-motion dispute resolution model
commonly associated with the judicial role.
Institutional reform litigation generally raises issues of the appropriateness
of the judicial role for such reforms, and the extraordinary remedy of
receivership amplifies the concern because it places all authority over the public
institution in the hands of the judicial branch. One could argue that when a
judge creates a receivership, she lacks the capacity to oversee the receiver and
must look to other experts to monitor the receiver's management. In the case of
the receiver appointed to run the D.C. child welfare system, the court appointed
a policy expert from the Center for the Study of Social Policy to oversee the
receiver. 2 There, the receivership remedy created a vicious cycle of monitoring
that spiraled into a judicially created fiefdom within local government.
However, this is not that exceptional within the context of institutional reform
litigation. One could similarly criticize special masters and monitors as
unnecessary judicial bureaucracy outside the proper role of the judicial branch.
Receivership may be viewed as a shift in judicial role, potentially
challenging the legitimacy of the judicial function. A prevalent concern is what
impact this continuing relationship will have on the judge's ability to be

249. See Diver, supra note 2 (worrying that the judge transformed into a political
"powerbroker" loses the legitimacy of the adjudicative function); see also Susan Sturm,
Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: StrategiesofJudicialIntervention in Prisons,138 U.
PA. L. REv. 805 (1990) (describing four models ofjudicial decision making: deferrer,
director, broker, and catalyst). Under Sturm's model, Judge Whipple would seem to be
a "director" judge because of his utilization of contempt sanctions and the ultimately
intrusive receivership remedy.
250. Interview with Julie Levin, supranote 22.
251. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Lines, supra note 194.
252. See Hamil P. Harris, Receiver Walks OffJob At Child Welfare Agency, WASH.
POST, Oct. 9, 1997, at DI (noting the battle that goes on within government agencies to
be elevated to the position of court-appointed receiver).
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Colin Diver worries that a managerial judge will engage in

"partisanship, manipulation, and guesswork offensive to accepted judicial virtues
of neutrality, passivity, and objectivity."' z'
Judge Whipple, like most

adjudicators, has an interest in the outcome of the litigation, both because of his
principled commitment to helping the residents of public housing, as well as his
professional interest in vindicating his choice of remedy.

The choice of

receivership, given its unusual nature, might create even more of a judicial stake
in the final result if a judge is seeking to confirm the appropriateness of his
remedial risk. 5
On the other hand, a judge's impartiality might not be dramatically altered
because the traditional judicial role encompasses broad equitable powers.
Without judicial intervention, the mandates of Brown v. Board ofEducation' 6
would never have materialized. In the 1950s, the judicial role exercised in
Brown was novel and exceptional, but it was necessary to prevent de jure
violations of Constitutional rights.' The receivership remedy is supposed to be
a last resort tool necessary to protect the rights of citizens. In turning over the
Alabama state prison system to a receiver, the federal court noted that "federal
courts time after time have been required to step into the vacuum left by the
state's inaction." 8 The Newmann court regretted the loss of governmental

autonomy that resulted from the receivership, but it noted that the action was
essential to protect continuing day-to-day violations of citizen's fundamental
rights2 9 Assuming the receivership in the Housing Authority case was the last
available remedial alternative, Judge Whipple acted within the traditions of the

253. See Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374,427 (1982)
(criticizing judicial management because it fosters frequent interactions over time that
lead to "intense feelings [of] admiration, friendship, or antipathy" which become "a
fertile field for the growth of personal bias"); see also Fiss, supranote 3, at 53 (worrying
that structural injunctions place the judge in an "architectural relationship with the newly
reconstituted state bureaucracy," a situation that threatens the judge's objectivity because
he identifies with the problems, frustrations, and actions of the litigants).
254. Diver, supranote 2, at 89.
255. When Judge Whipple imposed the receivership remedy in Tinsley, only one
other public housing authority, Boston, had been placed in receivership. It was not an
unprecedented remedy, but it was not the commonly used path of special masters,
monitors, and continued contempt citations.

256. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
257. See Fiss, supra note 3. Owen Fiss describes the role of adjudication as the
means "by which judges give meaning to our public values." Fiss, supranote 3, at 2.
He notes that the structural injunction in prisons, mental health, and police had strong
roots in the school desegregation cases that adapted judicial function to cope with the
emergence of expanding state bureaucracy. Fiss ultimately decides that structural

injunctions and judicial management of public institutional reform is a remedy with
potential viability, but a remedy that must be monitored. See Fiss, supra note 3, at 2-4.
258. Newman v. State of Ala., 466 F. Supp. 628, 636 (M.D. Ala. 1979).
259. Id.
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judicial role to seize control and stop the violation of the residents' statutory
rights.
A related implication of the receivership remedy is its lessons about judicial
capacity. Judge Whipple was not an expert on housing, and his crowded docket
and case-by-case method of adjudication did not allow him to become an expert
on public housing reform sufficient to remedy a dysfunctional agency. Because
he lacked the information and expertise necessary to competently resolve the
Housing Authority's problems, he eventually turned to the receivership remedy
that brought in a national housing expert to act as a judicial surrogate. Critics of
general institutional reform litigation point to problems inherent in the nature of
the judicial role and argue that judges are ill-suited for reforming public
institutions.260 It would be curious to know whether their criticisms about
judicial competence would yield to the receivership innovations employed by
Judge Whipple, or whether the critics would view the solution to the judge's lack
of expertise as worse than the problem. 6 1
The federal judiciary plays a role in the relations between nation and state
in our federal system. A common critique of judicial activism on the federal
bench is that it violates the principle of federalism by imposing the federal will
on the state's traditional functions of education, fighting crime, and caring for
the poor.262 As a result of this concern, most courts utilizing the receivership
remedy in the context of schools and prisons have appointed a state official to
take over the county or city institution, thus diluting somewhat the federalist
critique. 63 There is less of a federalism effect for the housing authority
receiverships because the institutions are hybrids-created by state law, but
almost entirely dependent on federal funds for their operation. Additionally,
housing is not viewed as a traditional local concern because public housing is
heavily regulated by federal regulations and statutes. Finally, public housing
260. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROwrrZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 25-38
(1977) (listing criticisms ofjudicial competence to handle reform litigation; judges are
generalists, judges can only hear problems on a piecemeal basis, judges cannot balance
priorities, judges have no incentive to specialize whereas Congresspersons do, and the
fit between right and remedy allows for little flexibility); Diver, supra note 2 (noting,
among other limitations on judicial capacity, that the judge rarely exercises contempt or
other disciplinary sanctions against litigants who fail to comply); but see Chayes, supra
note 4, at 1308 (praising the flexibility, immediacy of action, and avoidance of multilayered bureaucracy which results from an adjudication in public law litigation).
261. This analysis is not unique to receivership remedies, however. It could apply
to other third-party actors such as special masters or monitors who bring institutional
expertise to the judicial remedy. For illustration of the vicious monitoring cycle that can
be created to compensate for the lack ofjudicial capacity, see discussion of D.C. child
welfare agency receivership. See supranote 252 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,44 (1971) (federalism involves "the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the states and their iistitutions are
left free to perform their separate functions in their separate way").
263. See supranotes 166-67 and accompanying text.
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authorities are commonly viewed as businesses that operate rental property on
behalf of the government.2" As a result, no state officials serve as receivers in
the housing context, and little federalism protest has been voiced in these cases.
1I1. CONCLUSION
Receivership does have unique advantages as a remedy in the tool belt of
institutional reform litigation. It can unite two usually divergent camps.

Conservatives find receivership appealing because it places faith in the
efficiency of the private market, appointing private businesses to streamline
previously bloated government bureaucracies and eliminate government waste.
Advocates of judicial activism, traditionally more liberal in political affiliation,
support receivership as an important rights-based exercise ofjudicial discretion.
Second, receivership is unique because it enables a failing organization, rather
than simply mandating change and walking away. Receivership is uniquely
effective for public institutions suffering from mismanagement, incompetence,
or dysfunction as opposed to animus or illegal policy preferences. Many public
institutions, such as Kansas City's Housing Authority, fail to conform to consent
decrees not as much out of disregard for their mandates, but rather because of the
inability to redirect a failing agency in accordance with court directives. 5 By
infusing court-appointed expertise into the public agency, the receivership is
uniquely able to give a defendant agency the capacity to conform with court
orders or consent decrees.
However, there are dangers particular to the receivership remedy.
Receivership can create political debilitation, giving government officials
incentives to support court takeovers of failing institutions in order to avoid
responsibility and to remove the onerous organization from the government's
workload. The court may be opening the door for a reallocation of responsibility
from traditionally executive functions to the judicial branch. In addition, openended receivership orders, both in terms of scope and duration, raise serious
questions of Article I jurisdiction and judicial legitimacy. Because receivership
supplants the defendant organization with a court-appointed surrogate, there is
a danger that in the wrong hands the receivership remedy could be an
undemocratic usurpation of power. Giving the court power over all decisions
impacting a public agency's assets is essentially writing a blank check. In
Tinsley, the receiver and the judge acted with meritorious principle in protecting

264. The state courts in Perez noted that the Boston Housing Authority was
different than other institutions involved in institutional reform litigation because "it
functions in many respects as a business corporation to which receivership is readily
adapted." Perez compared the BHA to a turnpike authority. Perez v. Boston Hous.
Auth., 400 N.E.2d. 1231, 1251 (Mass. 1980).
265. Chester, D.C., and Kansas City all involved "de facto demolition" claims
illustrating likely organizational paralysis prior to remedial intervention. See supra note
35 and accompanying text.
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the interests of poor people while consulting the citizenry, but structurally that
was perhaps more by luck rather than design.
While the initial reaction to receivership is that it is a unique and
extraordinary exercise of judicial power, the realities of receivership illustrate
that it is not significantly different than other institutional reform litigation
remedies such as consent decrees, special masters, monitors, or structural
injunctions. The most prevalent countermajoritarian, legitimacy, scope, and
judicial capacity concerns raised in opposition to the receivership remedy can be
applied to all institutional reform litigation remedies. In fact, one could argue
that the receivership remedy is just a more honest admission of judicial
intervention into the operations of executive and legislative functions,
acknowledging displacement rather than cloaking judicial management in more
traditional remedial language. Moreover, concerns about receivership creating
new judicially managed bureaucracies can be similarly applied to the use of
special masters and monitors which do not displace, but rather oversee, public
institutions. Finally, the concern that a receivership's success depends heavily
on the abilities of the particular receiver are not particularly unique. The success
of any remedy is going to turn on the capabilities of the organization carrying out
the court's mandate. All of these factors combine to illustrate that receivership,
while extraordinary on its face, in practice is not a wholly exceptional remedial
intervention.
Throughout the analysis of the implications and effects of the receivership
remedy in the Tinsley litigation, this Article has questioned the court's means
while celebrating the end result. It is hard to deny the remarkable turnaround of

the public housing authority in Kansas City.266 Residents of T.B. Watkins now
live in completely modernized facilities where tenants occupy nearly all units.
The expansion of mixed-income developments has been heralded by tenants and

the business community as a successful new direction for Kansas City's public
housing. The means versus ends comparison is a common theme in institutional
reform litigation. If the judges are creating positive outcomes, does that justify
the process employed?

266. Similarly, receivers in Chester and D.C. have conducted remarkable
turnarounds as well. For accounts of the progress in the District of Columbia, see Fialka,
supra note 222, at A24 (praising D.C. housing receiver David Gilmore's success as
providing "a rare glimmer of good news" in D.C.); Stockard, supra note 239, at B8
(giving "the lion's share of the credit" for reforming the housing authority in D.C. to the
judge and David Gilmore). For a brief account of the success in Chester, see Gallman,
supra note 232, at B4. Gallman reports that the judge "was pleased"; the tenant council
president proclaimed, "They came in and pulled us out of the mess we've been in"; and
a $23 million renovation project in one of Chester's five housing projects was completed
in 1996, answering "years of prayers." Gallman, supra note 232, at B4. But see
OversightHearingon the D.C.'s Child andFamily Service Agency: Testimony of Rep.
Tom Davis,2000 WL 19303372 (May 5,2000) (declaring all D.C. receiverships failures
with the exception of the public housing receivership).
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One conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the receivership
remedy in Kansas City is that the parties were lucky because there were few
procedural safeguards in place to prevent an abuse of power by the receiver or
the court. Alternatively, the receivership remedy can be viewed as an
extraordinary measure which, when employed effectively in Kansas City,
produced striking and tangible change benefitting the plaintiff class. The very
nature of the intrusive remedy woke up the public housing community and
mandated change. A third assessment is that the receivership remedy is so
fundamentally flawed from a legal and political perspective that the ends would
never justify the means.
In reaching a verdict, it is helpful to consider what other alternatives were
available to protect the rights of the Tinsley class. First, there were few
alternatives outside of litigation and institutional reform through the courts.
Owen Fiss notes that critiques of institutional reform litigation "might have more
appeal if it were clear that there were alternative institutions that could better
perform this worthwhile but perilous activity."67 Fiss is unable to find any more
appropriate alternatives for reform.2 68 Prior to Tinsley, the Housing Authority in
Kansas City was replete with corruption and incompetence. In 1991, Judge
Whipple could arguably have given then-newly elected Mayor Cleaver an
opportunity to try to reform the Housing Authority. The problem was that
Mayor Cleaver would have had to have acted through the crippled institution
that was the Housing Authority in 1993. Without the power of the court to force
compliance, it is not clear that Mayor Cleaver would have experienced any more
success than his predecessors. This appears to be a case where litigation was the
best means of achieving political change.
A separate question is whether receivership specifically was the best means
to achieve the end of a reformed housing authority. Receivership seems most
appropriate as a remedy in cases such as Tinsley where there is extreme
organizational incompetence as opposed to resistance driven by animus or
difference ofpolicy opinion. -While corruption caused some of the violations in
Kansas City, much of the failure to comply with the 1991 Tinsley Consent

Decree was likely driven by institutional dysfunction and management
inexperience. The Housing Authority was a public institution without the will
or the ability to reform itself under the guidance of traditional modes ofjudicial
activism, here manifested in a consent decree. Within this lack-of-ability
context, it is unclear what benefit would come from further contempt citations
or court monitoring through a special master or monitor.
In the end, the Housing Authority's receivership success does seem to
justify the means employed. It is hard to overlook the rights of the T.B. Watkins
residents, living at one point in a development with a thirty-three percent

267. Fiss, supra note 3, at 33-35.

268. See Fiss, supranote 3, at 33-35 (rejecting the diversion alternative of creating
administrative agencies with special expertise capable of reorganizing social institutions).
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occupancy rate, and a complex filled with human waste, rats, and open drug
dealing in the hallways. One million dollars of the initial eleven million dollar
HUD grant mysteriously disappeared. HUD refused to release further funds
because of the severely corrupt and mismanaged character of the Housing
Authority. In a theoretical vacuum, one could argue that the judicial role is
inappropriately suited for such drastic activism as that employed by Judge
Whipple, but then one must ask whether the residents at T.B. Watkins should
have been forced to wait even longer for relief. It is true that Judge Whipple
could have built more checks into the receivership remedy and provided a clear
exit plan for ending the remedy. Moreover, the employment of a for-profit
receiver raises important questions about the disclosure of profits gained and the
extension of receivership outside the initial scope of the two offending
developments. Finally, the source of Judge Whipple's authority to act in the
Guinotte controversy is dubious. With these reservations aside, however, the
result is an almost complete overhaul of what was considered the worst public
housing in the country. Consequently, we are likely to see more of the
receivership remedy in institutional reform litigation.
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